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We study the relation between corporate governance and opportunistic timing of CEO option grants
via backdating or otherwise. Our methodology focuses on how grant date prices rank within the price
distribution of the grant month. During 1996-2005, about 12% of firms provided one or more lucky
grant -- defined as grants given at the lowest price of the month -- due to opportunistic timing. Lucky
grants were more likely when the board did not have a majority of independent directors and/or the
CEO had longer tenure -- factors associated with increased influence of the CEO on pay-setting. We
find no evidence that gains from manipulated grants served as a substitute for compensation paid through
other sources; total reported compensation from such sources was higher in firms providing lucky
grants. Finally, opportunistic timing has been widespread throughout the economy, with a significant
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I. INTRODUCTION
  The manipulation  of  executives’  option  grants  –  via  backdating,  “spring-loading based  on
the use of inside information, or other forms of opportunistic timing -- has been attracting a great
deal of attention.
1 The Senate Banking and Finance committees held hearings on the subject, and
the SEC and a small army of private law firms hired by companies are investigating past grant
practices. More than 120 companies have thus far come under scrutiny, dozens of executives and
directors have been forced to resign, and dozens of companies announced that they will have to
restate their past financial statements.
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Notwithstanding the substantial attention devoted to the subject, our understanding of the
circumstances and factors that produced opportunistic timing in some companies but not in
others remains incomplete. In this paper we seek to contribute to this understanding by
identifying the relation between opportunistic timing and the characteristics of the granting firm,
the receiving CEO, and the grant itself. Our tests identify a link between opportunistic timing
and factors associated with higher influence of the CEO over directors, such as lack of board
independence and long CEO tenure. We also find that opportunistic timing was not provided as a
substitute for other forms of compensation, but rather conferred extra benefits on executives
already receiving higher pay relative to their peers. Opportunistic timing was also more likely
when the economic gain from it was higher; indeed, even for the same firm or CEO, grant
manipulation was more likely to occur in the month in which stock price volatility made
manipulation more profitable.
1 The term "manipulation" is used in this paper (as in Heron and Lie (2006b))
to encompass any form of opportunistic timing of option grants. To remove
doubt, the term as we use it should not be understood to be equivalent to
manipulation as defined by law, and we do not take in this paper any
position on the legality or illegality of any actions or practices.
2 The Wall Street Journal maintains an "Options Scorecard" at www.wsj.com with an updated list of all
the companies that have come under scrutiny in connection with backdating issues, and it counted more
than 120 such companies as of Nov. 12, 2006. For an account of the large scale of investigations of past
grants conducted by companies with the help of hired outside professionals, see James Bandler and Kara
Scannell, "In Options Probes, Private Law Firms Play Crucial Role," Wall Street Journal, October 28,
2006.2
Prior work by financial economists on option timing has focused on the abnormality of
returns prior to or after the grant date (e.g., Yermack (1997); Lie (2005); Heron and Lie (2006a);
Narayanan and Seyhun (2006b)). Our approach focuses on the ranking of a grant date’s price in
the distribution of prices during the month of the grant. We show that the grant date
manipulation resulted in an abnormal fraction of the grants being given on days where the stock
price was at the lowest level of the month. Much (though not all) of our analysis focuses on
"lucky" grants – grants given at the lowest price of the month. We estimate that, during 1996-
2005, about 12% of our sample firms provided one or more lucky grants whose timing was the
result of manipulation. We show that lucky grants provide a useful tool for studying the
opportunistic timing of option grants including, in particular, identifying the firm and CEO
characteristics associated with manipulation and deriving estimates of the incidence and gains
from manipulation.
The universe of grants we study contains all the at-the-money, unscheduled grants
awarded to public companies' CEOs during the decade of 1996-2005. We find a clear monotonic
relation between how a trading day ranked within the price distribution of the month and the
likelihood that the day happened to be a grant date. Compared to a random assignment, a day
was most likely to be chosen if its stock price was at the lowest level, second most likely to be
chosen if its price was at the second-lowest level, and third most likely to be chosen if its price
was at the third lowest level. Similarly, dates with a stock price at the highest level of the month
were most likely to be avoided as grant dates, followed in turn by dates with the second-highest
price and then dates with the third-highest price.
Compared with a random assignment of grant dates, the excess incidence of grants is
concentrated at the lowest price of the month, that is, in the form of lucky grants. We estimate
that about 1,150 lucky grants (roughly half of all lucky grants in our sample) owe their status to
opportunistic timing rather than mere luck. This opportunistic timing was spread over a
significant number of CEOs and firms. We estimate that about 850 CEOs (about 10% of all
CEOs) and about 720 firms (about 12% of all firms) received or provided manipulated lucky
grants. In addition, about 550 additional grants at the second-lowest or third-lowest price of the
month owe their status to manipulation.
We provide evidence that backdating, and not merely "spring-loading" based on the use
of inside information, has been a major driver of the higher-than-random incidence of lucky3
grants. Opportunistic timing based on spring-loading is commonly viewed as raising less severe
concerns than one based on backdating. Spring-loading is unlikely to enable differentiating
between two stock prices that are very close together. However, we find that a day with the
lowest price of the month was substantially more likely to be selected as a grant date than a day
with the second lowest level even when the difference between the two price levels is less than
one percent. Of course, if an option is backdated when the whole distribution of stock prices is
known, one could choose to take advantage even of such small differences in prices.
We then turn to examine the characteristics of firms, CEOs, and grant circumstances that
were correlated with lucky grants. We find that the occurrence of lucky grants was correlated
with factors that are associated with increased influence of the CEO on the company's internal
pay-setting and decision-making processes. Lucky grants were more likely to occur when the
company did not have a majority of independent directors on the board. Furthermore, lucky
grants were more likely to occur when the CEO had longer tenure. The contribution of increased
tenure to a higher likelihood of getting a lucky grant was especially significant for CEOs hired
from outside the firm; these CEOs started with a lower likelihood of lucky grants, but as their
tenure increased, their incidences of lucky grants has increased at a faster pace, narrowing the
difference in lucky grants incidence between them and CEOs hired from the inside. These
findings are consistent with the view that grant date manipulation reflects governance problems.
Consistent with the view that manipulated timing reflects an economic decision, we find
that lucky grants were more likely when the potential payoffs from manipulation were relatively
high. Indeed, not only were lucky grants more common in companies with a volatile stock price
but also, for a given CEO with more than one grant, the likelihood of an individual grant being
lucky increased when the gap between the lowest and the median price in the month of the grant
was higher.
Looking at the patterns over a CEO's service, we further find that luck has been
persistent. The odds of a CEOs' grant being lucky were significantly higher when a preceding
grant to the CEO was lucky as well.4
We also test the conjecture put forward by various observers that backdating was
rationally used by firms as a tax-advantaged substitute for other forms of compensation.
3 This
view would predict that, all else constant, firms awarding lucky grants should tend to provide
lower CEO compensation from other sources. We find, however, that CEOs benefiting from
lucky grants received a significantly higher total compensation from other sources, not a lower
one.
The cases that have come under scrutiny thus far have led to a widespread impression
that grant manipulation has been largely or at least primarily concentrated in new economy
firms. While we find that the odds of lucky grants have been somewhat higher in new economy
firms, grant manipulation has been widespread in economy firms, and more than 80% of
manipulated lucky grants have been given in such firms. Looking beyond the new economy/old
economy dichotomy, we find a significant incidence of grant manipulation in each of the
economy's twelve industries (using the Fama-French classification). Indeed, controlling for firm
and grant financial characteristics, there is no statistically significant correlation between the
odds of lucky grants and most industry classifications.
While much of our analysis focuses on grants awarded at monthly lows, we also extend
our analysis to investigate manipulation within a broader time period. We find that about 1,000
lucky grants (43% of all lucky grants) were "super-lucky," defined as grants awarded at the
lowest price of the calendar quarter. We estimate that about 62% of all super-lucky grants owe
their status to manipulation. We also estimate that about 11% of firms and about 7% of CEOs
were involved in the awarding or receiving of super-lucky grants that were manipulated.
By identifying factors that have made grants more likely to be lucky even though they
would not have had such an effect under random selection, our analysis allows us to identify
certain pools of grants that are associated with a substantially higher incidence of manipulation.
For example, we identify a pool of 600 grants in which 88% of the grants are estimated to have
been manipulated.
3 This possibility was raised, for example, by Wall Street Journal columnist Holman Jenkins Jr. and by a
Wall Street Journal editorial.  See Jenkins, "Business World: The 'Backdating' Witch Hunt," Wall Street
Journal, June 21, 2006; "Backdating to the Future," October 12, 2006.  The possibility that backdating has
been partly driven by section 162(m) of the Tax Code, which limited to $1 million the deduction that
companies may take for the nonperformance compensation paid to any given executive, was one of the
reasons leading the Senate Finance Committee to schedule hearings on backdating and the tax treatment
of executive pay.5
Finally, we also derive an estimate of the gains to CEOs from backdating. It has been
suggested that the value of backdating to CEOs has been rather limited (see, e.g., Walker
(2006)). Our (conservative) estimates indicate that these gains were rather significant with an
estimated average gain to CEOs from lucky grants that were manipulated exceeding 20% of the
reported value of the grant and increasing the CEO's total reported compensation for the year by
more than 10%.
The literature on the timing of option grants begins with the seminal work by Yermack
(1997), showing that stock prices exhibit negative abnormal returns prior to a grant date and
positive abnormal return afterwards. While Yermack attributes this pattern to the use of private
inside information, Aboody and Kasznik (2000), and Chauvin and Shenoy (2001) suggest that it
was partly due to manipulation of firms' information disclosures. The celebrated paper by Lie
(2005) puts forward backdating as an important cause of the abnormal stock returns preceding
and following grant dates. Heron and Lie (2006a), Narayanan and Seyhun (2006a), and Collins,
Gong, and Li (2005) study how the patterns of pre- and post-grant returns were influenced by the
adoption of SOX, which imposed a two-day filing requirement on firms making option grants,
thus confirming the existence of backdating. Narayanan and Seyhun (2006b) find support in pre-
and post-grant returns for the use of two different types of mis-dating techniques. Heron and Lie
(2006b) use return patterns to show that a significant fraction of grants had their timing
manipulated and to explore the correlation between the return patterns and firm characteristics.
We contribute to the literature in several ways. First, we establish a correlation between
grant manipulation and governance, showing that timing was correlated with the lack of a
majority of independent directors on the board. Second, we identify a connection between timing
and CEOs' characteristics, indicating that the likelihood of timing increased with CEO tenure.
Third, we point out that, over time, a given CEO was more likely to receive a lucky grant when
the payoffs from such a lucky grant were higher. Fourth, we identify the persistence of CEO
luck. Fifth, we show that lucky grants have been associated with higher total compensation to the
CEO through all reported sources.
We also contribute to the literature by providing an alternative approach for studying
option timing, one that is based on the ranking of the grant price within the price distribution of
the month rather than one that is based on a comparison of pre- and post- abnormal returns. In
particular, we show how grants at the bottom of the price distribution of the grant month – and6
especially lucky grants – can provide a useful tool for identifying links between timing
opportunism and the characteristics of firms and CEOs. We are also able to use lucky grants to
derive estimates for the incidence of, and payoff from, grant manipulation.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on the potential benefits of independent
directors. Empirical work has not found a robust relationship between the presence of
independent directors and firm value (see Bhagat and Black (1999, 2002); Chhaochharia and
Grinstein (2006a)). There is evidence, however, that a majority of independent directors on the
board has a significant impact on certain specific areas of corporate behavior (Byrd and Hickman
(1992), Shivdasani (1993); Brickley, Coles, and Terry (1994), Cotter, Shivdasani, and Zenner
(1997); Dann, Del Guercio, and Partch (2003); Gillette, Noe, and Rebello (2003), and Weisbach
(1987)). We contribute to this literature by showing that the lack of a majority of independent
directors is correlated with manipulated timing of option grants. This finding is consistent with
recent work suggesting that independent directors might have an impact on executive
compensation decisions (e.g., Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999), Chhaochharia and Grinstein
(2006b)) and the incidences of fraud (e.g., Beasely (1996, 2000), Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeny
(1996)).
In addition, our analysis contributes to understanding the significance of length of time a
CEO has served in this position. Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) and Cyert, Kang, and
Kumar (2002) find that the CEO is more likely to get a high pay as well as a golden parachute
when more of the outside directors have been appointed under the current CEO.
The remainder of our analysis is organized as follows. Section II describes our data and
provides summary statistics. Section III examines the extent to which the incidence of lucky
grants has been affected by opportunistic timing, as well as the extent to which such
opportunistic timing has partly resulted from backdating rather than the use of private
information. Section IV investigates the relation between option timing and governance
arrangements, firm characteristics, CEO characteristics, and the payoffs from getting a lucky
grant.  Section V analyzes how the incidence of lucky grants varied across the economy's
different industries. Section VI estimates the gains to CEOs from lucky grants. Section VII
investigates whether firms providing lucky grants tended to pay CEOs less via other forms of
compensation. Section VIII extends our analysis to examine grants whose grant price was lowest
not only in the grant month but also in the calendar quarter. Section IX concludes.7
II. PRICERANKS: SIGNIFICANCE, DATA, AND SUMMARYSTATISTICS
A. Detecting Option Grant Date Anomalies
The literature on the opportunistic timing of option grants (starting with Yermack, 1997)
– and the more recent literature on backdating (Lie (2005), Heron and Lie (2005a, b), Narayanan
and Seyhun (2006a, b)) -- have focused on post- and pre-grant stock returns as their tool for
detecting and investigating abnormal patterns. In particular, to detect patterns that could be the
result of backdating, this research examined whether post-grant returns tended to be positive,
whether pre-grant returns tended to be negative, and whether post-grant returns tended to exceed
pre-grant returns. Post- and pre-grant returns have then been the tool used by this research to
investigate the variables correlated with grant manipulation as well as to estimate the incidence
of such manipulation.
4
We use an alternative approach to investigate abnormal patterns by focusing on the rank
of the price on the day of the option grant relative to the distribution of the prices of the month.
Consider a grant that was provided in a given month, and suppose that the relevant decision-
makers inside the firm reported the grant after the month and were willing to retroactively select
a date with a favorable low stock price. In this case, one would expect the grant to have been
reported as given at the lowest price of the month or, if the decision-makers wanted to err on the
side of caution, at some other price at the bottom of the month's price distribution (e.g., the
second-lowest or third-lowest price). Our strategy is therefore to examine whether at-the-money
grants given at stock prices at the bottom of the price distribution were abnormally frequent. As a
benchmark we compute the expected probability of the grant being given on a certain day of the
month, based on the assumption that the grant date is chosen without regard to the price
distribution.
5
  Looking at price ranks can be  useful  in zeroing in  on instances of manipulation via
backdating. Suppose that a company reported that it provided a grant in the middle of a month
4 Heron and Lie (2006b) observe that grant dates are more likely to rank low rather than high in the
distribution of prices, and Narayanan and Seyhun (2006b) show the existence of such tendency in post-
SOX grants that are reported late; but these studies use pre- and post-grant returns as their main tool of
analysis.
5 Although we refer to the benchmark as one of "random selection" of grant dates, this is not meant to
involve a strictly random assignment but rather one in which grant dates are selected on the basis of
factors that are independent of price-rank considerations.8
with an exercise price equal to the $100 price on the grant date. Suppose also that the price on
the first day of the month (and prior to it) was $111, that the price at the last day of the month
(and subsequently) was $110, and that the stock price was $90 in all other days of the month. In
this case, the grant was preceded by a -10% stock return and followed by a +10% stock return.
While these post- and pre-grant returns could reflect timing based on the use of inside
information, a look at price ranks suggests that this grant is unlikely to have been backdated; the
grant was awarded at the third-highest price of the month, and the grant's designers could have
easily, and in the event of backdating would have likely, placed it on a day with a more favorable
exercise price juts prior or just after the officially reported date.
  Consider also a hypothetical  case in  which  the  stock price was relatively flat during the
month, with the stock price equal to $101 in all days except for one day in which the price was
$100, and suppose that the grant was reported to have been awarded on the date with the $100
stock price. In this case, the pre- and post-grant return patterns of -1% and +1% respectively, are
consistent with timing but far from remarkable. A look at price ranks, however, indicates that the
grant was awarded at the lowest price of the month, with the most favorable timing during the
month that was at all possible.
Price rankings thus provide a potentially useful method to detect abnormally favorable
grant practices and correlating such practices to relevant variables. In this first comprehensive
examination of grant practices based on price ranks, we use the grant month as the examined
period for much of our analysis. That is, our inquiry focuses on how grant prices ranked within
the price distribution of the grant month. This inquiry focuses, as it were, on investigating
backdating instances in which the "look-back" period spanned a calendar month.
6
While our choice of period enables us to focus on the backdating instances that were
likely of greatest economic significance for CEOs and shareholders, our analysis does not and is
not designed to capture fully instances of backdating based on small look-back periods.
Narayanan and Seyhun (2006b) demonstrate that, especially during the post-SOX period, there
have been likely numerous instances in which grants were mis-dated by just a few days, often by
just one or two days. Thus, we should caution the reader that our analysis investigates an
important subset of backdating practices, not all of them, and that the estimates we derive for
manipulated grants in this subset are not estimates of the total number of manipulated grants.
6 Later in the paper we show some robustness tests using the calendar quarter instead of the month.9
B. The Data
We construct our dataset from Thomson Financial’s insider trading database, which
includes all insiders’ filings of equity transactions in forms 3, 4, 5, and 144 between the years
1996-2006. In the course of constructing this dataset we use procedures similar to those used by
Heron and Lie (2006a, b) and Narayanan and Seyhun (2006b). Our dataset includes observations
with a cleanse indicator of R (“data verified through the cleansing process”), H (“cleansed with a
very high level of confidence”), or C (“a record added to nonderivative table or derivative table
in order to correspond with a record on the opposing table”). We restrict our sample to
transactions that occurred before 12/31/2005 (so that data about stock prices during the grant
month are available in the 2005 CRSP database). We further require stock returns to be available
for the entire month of the grant date. Finally, we include grants to the CEO, president, or
chairman of the board to address the possibility that CEOs sometimes identify themselves as
chairman or president in their SEC filings.
We eliminate any duplicate grants that occur on a given grant date so that there is only
one grant for a given date and company combination. After eliminating multiple grants, our
sample consists of 41,397 grants. From this sample we eliminate grants that are scheduled, which
might be less likely to have been manipulated. A grant is defined as a scheduled grant if the CEO
received a grant on the same date plus/minus one day in the preceding year. We also eliminate
grants that were given in months where the firm had an ex-date of a dividend; to the extent that
firms schedule grants after a dividend's ex-date, the grant price might fall below the stock prices
preceding the ex-date even in the absence of any backdating or spring-loading.
Finally, we check whether the strike price of the grant is close enough to the closing price
of the grant date, or to the closing price of a day before or a day after the grant. A close enough
price is defined as a price that is within 1% of the strike price. The date with the nearest closing
price to the strike price is then defined as the effective grant date.
7 The dataset constructed along
the above lines contains about 19,000 grants in about 6,000 firms.
7  Consistent with Heron and Lie (2006a), we are also able to allocate the strike prices of about half of the
grants in the sample. Heron and Lie discuss in detail the possible reasons for deviation from the strike
price.10
C. Summary Statistics
Table 1 shows the distribution of the grants depending on the grant day price-rank during
the calendar month of the grant.
The last two columns show the percentage of grants whose grant price was below and
above the median price of the month. Fifty-six percent of the grants in our sample were given at
a strike price below the median price, compared with only 38% that were given at a price above
the median (6% of the grants are given exactly at the median price): a difference of 18%.  We
also see that the asymmetry of the distribution was greater when the grant was given before the
adoption of SOX than afterwards.
Table 1 also displays the changes over time in the incidence of grants below and above
the median. The asymmetry of the distribution peaks in 2001, with a 27% difference between the
below-median and above-median groups, and then declines sharply after SOX.
Table 1 also provides statistics about the percentage of grants at given price ranks.
Overall, we observe a clear monotonic relation between the rank of the price in a month and the
percentage of grants given at that level. For the full sample, the frequency of grants is the highest
at the lowest price of the month (12%), second-highest at the second-lowest price of the month
(9%), third-highest at the third-lowest price level (8%), and so forth. Conversely, the frequency
of grants is lowest at the highest price level (4%), second-lowest at the second-highest level
(5%), and so forth.
We find that much of the "action" is at the top and bottom parts of the price-rank
distribution with a large difference between the incidences of grants at the lowest and highest
prices of the month. In fact, 12% of grants were given at the lowest price of the month, but only
4% were given at the highest price of the month; with the difference being even bigger (15% vs.
4%) prior to the adoption of SOX. Needless to say, such a difference would not be expected if
grant dates were randomly selected. The difference between the second-lowest and the second-
highest groups is smaller but still substantial – 9% vs. 5%. And the differences continue to
narrow as one moves further away from the extremes of the price distribution.11
Our sample contains many CEOs who received more than one grant, as well as many
firms that awarded grants to two or more CEOs during the considered period.
8 Thus, one might
wonder whether the grants producing the asymmetry displayed in Table 1 are concentrated in a
relatively small number of CEOs and firms. To get a sense whether this is the case, Table 2
displays the distribution of grant prices across CEOs and firms.
Table 2, panel A shows that 45% of CEOs had at least one grant at one of the three
lowest prices of the month, but only 26% had at least one grant at one of the three highest prices
of the month. Similarly, while 22% of CEOs had at least one grant at the lowest price of the
month, only 9% had at least one grant at the highest price of the month. These figures suggest
that the asymmetry in the incidence of grants at the bottom and top of the price distribution is not
due to a small number of CEOs.
Table 2, panel B similarly shows that the asymmetry is not due to a small number of
firms that among them manipulated a large number of grants. While 58% of firms gave one or
more grant at one of the three lowest prices of the month, only 35% of firms gave one or more
grant at one of the three highest prices. Furthermore, 30% of firms gave one or more grant at the
lowest price of the month, compared with 12% that gave one or more grant at the highest price of
the month.
Table 3 shows univariate statistics on the differences between grants that were lucky and
other grants (panel A) and differences in the incidence of lucky grants among different groups of
grants (panel B). The table indicates that lucky grants were more frequent (at 1% significance):
• in months in which the difference between the lowest and the median price of the month was
higher;
• before SOX was adopted;
• in firms with below-median size;
• in new economy firms;
• among grants provided to CEOs with longer tenure and/or ownership stake exceeding 5%;
• in companies without a majority of independent directors on the board;
• in companies without an independent compensation committee; and
8 In our sample, 4,510 CEOs received one grant, 1,874 received two grants, 1,050 received three grants,
and 1,386 received four or more grants. Also, 3,510 firms in our sample have one CEO, 1,560 have two
CEOs, and 697 firms have three or more CEOs (Table 2).12
• when a preceding grant to the CEO was lucky.
We shall discuss these relations in greater detail below when we run multivariate
regressions.
III. CEOS' LUCK
A.  Mere Luck?
To evaluate whether and how the selection of days to serve as grant dates deviated from
random, we run the following logit regression over all the days in each of the months in which a
grant is given:
Is_Grantit =a0 + a1* Dummy_Three_lowest_pricesit  +    (1)
 a2*Dummy_Three_highest_pricesit + eit
where Is_Grantit is a dummy variable that equals one if at date t firm i granted options to
the CEO, and zero otherwise. Dummy_Three_lowest_pricesit is a dummy variable that equals
one if the price at date t was one of the three lowest prices of the month; , and
Dummy_Three_highest_pricesit  is a dummy variable that equals one if the price at date t was
one of the three highest prices of the month and zero otherwise. We cluster the errors by CEOs.
The clustering corrects for correlations in the error terms {eit} across grants that are given to the
same CEO. Table 4, column 1 shows the results of the logit regression (1). The coefficient of the
Dummy_Three_lowest_pricesit variable is 0.531, and the coefficient of the
Dummy_Three_highest_pricesit  is -0.179. Both coefficients are statistically different from zero
at the 1% level. Thus, for any given trading day that was a potential candidate for selection as
grant date, having a stock price that is one of the three lowest prices of the month makes that day
more likely to be selected as a grant date, and having a day with a price that is one of the three
highest prices of the month makes that day less likely to be selected as a grant date.
In a logit regression, the coefficients are the log of the odds that a date will be chosen as a
grant date. Thus, relative to the default of a day that is not among the three lowest or three
highest, a day with a price among the three lowest prices of the month will have odds that are
exp(0.531) = 1.70 times larger (that is, 70% higher) to be selected as a grant date, and a day with13
a price among the three highest will have odds that are exp(-0.179) = 0.88 times smaller (that is,
12% lower) to be chosen as a grant date.
Because SOX required reporting option grants within two days after the grant is given,
grant timing manipulation can be expected to be less prominent after SOX (Heron and Lie
(2006a), Narayanan and Seyhun (2006a), Collins, Gong, and Li (2005)). As Heron and Lie
(2006a) and Narayanan and Seyhun (2006b) show, however, more than 20% of companies did
not comply with the two-day filing requirement during the post-SOX period, and SOX therefore
could not eliminate manipulation altogether. To take the difference between the pre- and post-
SOX periods into account, we re-run the regression (1) interacting the explanatory variables with
dummies for whether the grant was given before SOX or after SOX.
We present the results in column 2 of Table 4. The coefficient of the
Dummy_Three_lowest_pricesit variable is 0.585 for the pre-SOX period and 0.406 for the post-
SOX period. Again, both coefficients are statistically significantly different from zero at the 1%
level. Thus, the results indicate that SOX did not bring an end to the higher-than-random
selection of days at the bottom of the distribution.  A test of a difference between the two
coefficients, however, indicates that the pre-SOX coefficient is higher than the post-SOX
coefficient. This result is consistent with SOX reducing the incidences of grant manipulation.
Also, column 2 indicates that the coefficient of the Dummy_Three_highest _pricesit
variable is -0.238 for the pre-SOX period and -0.064 for the post-SOX period. The former
coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 1% level, the latter only at the 10% level, and
a test of the difference between the two coefficients indicates that the pre-SOX coefficient is
lower than the post-SOX coefficient. Thus, the results are consistent with SOX reducing but not
eliminating the moving of grant dates away from the three highest prices of the month.
B. The Monotonic Relation between Price Rank and Likelihood of Granting Options
Having lumped together the three lowest price levels, as well as the three highest price
levels, we now explore how levels within each group differ. Specifically, we run the following
regression:14
Is_Grantit =a0 + a1* Dummy_lowest_priceit  +     (2)
 a2*Dummy_2
nd lowest_priceit +….+a4* Dummy_4
th lowest priceit +  b4 * Dummy_4
th
highest_priceit + ….+b1*highest_priceit +eit
We again cluster the errors by CEOs. The clustering corrects for correlations in the error
terms {eit} across grants that are given to the same CEO. We present the results in Table 5.
The results in Table 5 column 1 show a monotonic relation between the likelihood of
getting a grant on a particular date and the rank of the price on that date. We form a series of t-
tests of differences between adjacent coefficients and reject the null of no differences. The
results are also economically significant. For example, the coefficient on the
Dummy_lowest_priceit is 0.885, implying that if the date has the lowest price of the month, the
odds of giving a grant on that date increase by a factor of exp(0.885) = 2.4 (or by 140%).
Conversely, the coefficient of the highest price is -0.211, implying that if the date has the highest
price of the month, the odds of giving a grant on that date decreases by a factor of exp (-0.211) =
0.81 (or by 19%).
Column 2 shows the results where each of the coefficients in (2) is interacted with a
dummy variable for whether the grant was given before or after SOX. Consistent with the results
in Table 2, dates at the bottom of the distribution were each more likely to be selected before
SOX than after SOX, though each of them still remained after SOX more likely to occur than
under random assignment. Moreover, both before SOX and after SOX, the likelihood of
selection went down monotonically from the highest to the lowest price of the month price of the
month.
C. Estimating the Percentage of Manipulated Grants
Having seen that the lowest three prices have been selected more often than under
random assignment, and that days with the three highest prices have been selected less often, we
now turn to estimate the number of grants that have been manipulated in one direction or
another. For every price rank included in Table 1, we calculate the expected number of grants
with that price rank if grants were randomly assigned over the trading days during the grant15
month.
9 This estimation is done by calculating for each individual grant, assuming random
assignment, the probability of being granted at the specific price rank, and then aggregating these
probabilities across all grants. Because of the large number of grants involved, a random
assignment is highly unlikely to deviate significantly from the expected number we calculate.
The difference between the actual number of grants in any price rank and the expected
number provides our estimate for the number of grants whose timing was manipulated. This
estimation method is conservative because it assumes that, for each price rank, all manipulation
was done in one direction, either into or out of that price rank. For example, we find that the
number of grants given at the third lowest price of the month exceeds the expected number by
112 grants. This calculation assumes that the manipulation only takes the form of moving the
112 grants from higher price ranks to this category. However, if some grants were moved from
the third-lowest-price category to the lowest- or second-lowest, then more than 112 grants had to
move to the third-lowest category from higher ranks, and thus more than 112 grants of those
reported with the third-lowest-price had to be manipulated.
Table 6 shows our estimation results. We estimate that over the full sample period of
1996-2005, 1,163 lucky grants – about 50% of all lucky grants – were manipulated. The
percentage of lucky grants that were lucky due to manipulation was about 55% before SOX and
35% afterwards. Relative to the total number of grants, about 6% of the total grants were
manipulated to occur at the lowest price of the month.
We find a somewhat smaller but still substantial fraction of manipulated grants among
grants given at the second- and third-lowest prices of the month. For grants with the second-
lowest (third-lowest) price of the month, we estimate that about 23% (11%) are manipulated. Our
estimates of the fraction of manipulated grants in these categories are about the same before
SOX and after SOX. Overall, we estimate that, during 1996-2005, there were about 1,700 grants
9 The scenario of random assignment also assumes that, after the day is randomly selected, the
distribution of prices among the month's different days is not manipulated or affected by the choice of
grant date. The probability of a day being the lowest price day is computed by the ratio of the number of
days in the grant month that have the lowest price to the number of trading days in that firm’s stock
during the grant month.16
that were placed in one of the three lowest prices due to manipulation. Such grants comprised
9% of all the grants awarded during this period (11.4% before SOX).
10
Once we move to price ranks above the third-lowest price, we find that the number of
actual grants does not significantly exceed the estimated number under random assignment even
for the fourth-lowest and fifth-lowest price categories. Thus, the aggregate number of actual
grants in these categories does not provide evidence of significant manipulation. Note, however,
that the aggregate number of grants in these categories could be the product of a significant
number of grants moving to these categories from higher price ranks and a roughly similar
number moving from these categories to lower price ranks.
Finally, with respect to grants given at the highest prices of the month, the actual number
of grants is significantly below the estimated number under random assignment. For each of the
highest-, second-highest, and third-highest categories, the actual number of grants was lower by
more than 30% relative to the estimated number under random assignment. Of course, in the
event of opportunistic timing, these categories are more valuable to avoid and costly to move
into.
Table 6 also gives a sense of the magnitude of the discount in exercise price that
manipulation could produce. For the category of lucky grants, the grant price was on average
12% lower than the median price of the month.
Table 7 provides our estimates of the number of CEOs who received, and the number of
firms which provided, manipulated grants. Again, our estimation methodology is to calculate the
difference between actual numbers and the ones expected under random assignment. The table
indicates that the number of CEOs with one or more lucky grants (1,931) exceeds the number
estimated under random assignment by about 850. The estimated number of CEOs receiving one
or more lucky grants due to manipulation comprises about 10% of all CEOs in our sample. With
respect to firms, the number of those providing one or more lucky grants exceeds the estimated
number under random assignment by about 720. This figure implies that about 12% of all firms
in our sample provided one or more lucky grants due to manipulation.
10 Our estimate for manipulated grants at one of the lowest three prices of the months is consistent with
the higher figure estimated by Heron and Lie (2006b) for the total number of manipulated grants. As
discussed in Section II, we do not attempt to capture "small-scale" backdating in which grants were mis-
dated by a small number of days, whereas the Heron-Lie methodology which is based on comparison of
pre- and post-grant returns attempts to capture such instances of manipulation as well.17
D. Backdating or Spring-Loading?
Deviations from patterns expected under random assignment might be not only due to
backdating but also due to spring-loading based on private information (e.g., Yermack (1997)).
Having found that many lucky grants owe their presence in this category to manipulation, we
turn to examine the possibility that such manipulation was largely driven by spring-loading
rather than backdating. To examine this possibility, we conduct three tests of the hypothesis that
the excess incidence of lucky grants was largely due to spring-loading.
11
The first test we conduct focuses on grants awarded in months in which the difference
between the lowest and second-lowest prices of the month was very small. In such cases, it is
implausible that insiders would view one price level as reflecting significant under-valuation but
not the other. Accordingly, under the spring-loading hypothesis, one would not expect a
significant difference in the odds of selecting as a grant date the lowest versus the second-lowest
price day. In contrast, in the event of backdating selecting the best price available in retrospect,
such a difference can still be expected even when the lowest and second-lowest prices are very
little apart.
We therefore pick from our database only grants given in a month in which the difference
between the lowest and second-lowest prices is less than 1%. About half of the grants (9,684
grants) fall into this category. We then run the following regression:
Is_Grantit =a0 + a1* Dummy_lowest_priceit+ a2* Dummy_second_lowest_priceit (3)
Table 8 column 1 shows the results of regression (3). The coefficients a1 and a2 are both
positive and statistically significant. However, the coefficient a1 is significantly larger than the
coefficient a2. The a1 coefficient is 0.582, and the a2 coefficient is 0.381. Therefore, the odds
that the grant is given at the lowest price of the month are exp(0.582)=1.72 times higher than
they are given on other days, while the odds that the grant is given at the second-lowest price of
11 Our tests complement the work of Lie (2005), Heron and Lie (2006a), and Narayanan and Seyhun
(2006b), who show that backdating has been a major driver of the abnormal patterns of pre- and post-
grant returns. Because our focus below is on a subset of manipulated grants – those resulting in grants at
the lowest price of the month – we seek to confirm that backdating has played a substantial role in this
important subset of manipulated grants.18
the month are only exp(0.381)=1.46 times higher. The difference between the coefficients is
significantly different from zero at the 1% level. This result is inconsistent with the view that the
excess incidence of lucky grants is solely the product of spring loading.
 Table 8 column 2 shows the result of a version of regression (3) where the sample
consists of only the days of the month in which the price is the lowest or the second lowest, and
the regression has only the lowest-price dummy variable. Absent any backdating, we should
expect an even distribution between grants that are given at the lowest price of the month and
grants that are given at the second-lowest price of the month, since we should not expect
managers to target exactly the lowest price of the month with information releases. Therefore,
the coefficient of the lowest price dummy should equal zero. However, the coefficient is 0.1661
and is statistically significantly different from zero. Thus, the odds of picking the lowest day of
the month are exp(0.1661)=1.18 times higher than the odds of picking the second lowest price of
the month.
Our second test for whether the excess of lucky grants was driven by spring-loading is
based on when the company reported the grant to the SEC.
12 Under the spring-loading
hypothesis, grant dates are chosen on the basis of the favorable private information that insiders
had at the time of the grant. Thus, under this hypothesis, the odds of a lucky grant are not
expected to depend on how long after the grant date reporting occurred. In contrast, if grant dates
are manipulated to backdate the grant at the lowest price, then reporting the grant in the
following month only, or at least later in that month, facilitates the selection of the lowest price
of the month as the grant price.
To distinguish between grants that are reported close to the grant date and grants that are
filed later, we introduce two dummy variables: Reported_same_month, which equals one if the
filing with the SEC occurs in the same month as the grant and zero otherwise; and
Reported_next_month, which equals one if the filing date is in the month following the grant
month or later. About 33% of the grants in our sample were filed in the same month as the grant
month. (80% of those after SOX and 6% of those preceding SOX.) We then run the following
regression:
12 Heron and Lie (2006a) and Narayanan and Seyhun (2006b) analyze how the pre- and post-grant returns
accompanying grants have been influenced by when the company reported the grant.19
Is_Grantit =a0 + a1* Dummy_lowest_priceit * Reported_same_month
+ a2* Dummy_lowest_priceit  *  Reported_next_month  +          (4)
+eit
Under the spring-loading hypothesis, the filing month should be irrelevant. Accordingly,
the hypothesis predicts that we should see no differences between the coefficients a1 and a2.
We show the results in Table 9. The coefficient of a2 is larger than the coefficient of a1
by 0.406, and a t-test rejects the null that the two coefficients are the same. The odds of a lucky
grant that is reported in the same month is exp(0.557) =1.74 times as high as those reported on
other dates, and the odds of a lucky grant reported in the next month only is exp(0.963)=2.62 as
high.
Our third test of the spring-loading hypothesis is based on the idea that insiders are likely
to have private firm-specific information but unlikely to have such information about the future
direction of the stock market (Lie (2005)). Table 10 shows the results of a regression where the
dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm gave a grant on that day and zero
for all other days of the month. Only months with grants are included in the regression. The
independent variable of interest is the return of the stock from the grant date until the end of the
month. In column 1 the explanatory variable is the raw return, and in column 2 we decompose
the return into the market return component (using the CRSP value-weighted return), and the
idiosyncratic component.
The results in Columns 1 – 2 suggest that both the idiosyncratic component of the return
and the market component of the return are positively related to the likelihood that a grant will
be given on the specific date. Both components are significant at the 1% significance level. This
result reinforces the conclusion that backdating has played a significant role in producing the
higher-than-expected incidence of lucky grants.
IV. THE DETERMINANTS OF LUCK
We have identified a significant presence of manipulated grants among grants given at
one of the lowest three prices of the month – and especially among lucky grants given at monthly
lows. Because a large fraction of lucky grants owe their status to manipulation, lucky grants20
provide a useful tool for studying the factors likely to be associated with manipulation, and we
now turn to pursue this inquiry.
A. Grant Circumstances and Firm Characteristics
We begin our inquiry with factors for which the necessary data are in Thomson and
CRSP, and thus enable us to conduct tests based on our grant dataset as a whole. We run the
following regression of whether a grant was lucky on various explanatory variables:
Luckyit = [FIRM CHARACTERISTICSit] + [GRANT CHARACTERISTICSit]  (5)   +
SOXit + eit
In some of the specifications, we include firm and CEO fixed effects. When these are not
included, we cluster the errors by CEOs to correct for potential correlations across the likelihood
of lucky grants among the same CEOs.
 The first firm characteristic we use in the regression is size. Smaller firms might have
less outside scrutiny and less visibility, making grant manipulation less likely to be detected by
outsiders. Our variable for size is the natural log of relative market capitalization – defined as the
ratio of the market capitalization of the firm at the grant date divided by the median market
capitalization of all firms that gave a grant during that year.
We also use a variable that classifies firms into new and old economy firms following the
definition in Murphy (2003).
13 Option grants practices can develop and spread within industries
in new economy firms, as industry insiders (and even their advisers) are more likely to network
with each other than with those in old economy firms. And the fact that most of the backdating
cases identified thus far have been of new economy firms, such manipulation is now viewed by
many as likely to have been concentrated among such firms.
We also include in the regression the percentage difference between the lowest and
median price of the grant month (in log). This variable is used as a proxy for the potential
payoffs from turning a grant actually given on another day into a lucky grant. If manipulation
were an economic decision determined by payoffs, then a higher propensity of grants should be
13 Murphy (2003) defines new economy firms as firms that belong to the following four-digit SIC codes: 3570,
3571, 3572, 3576, 3577, 3661, 3674, 4812, 4813, 5045, 5961, 7370, 7371, 7372, and 7373.21
lucky in months with high lowest-to-median price differences. Alternatively, if the manipulation
is a standard practice in some clusters of firms without attempting to maximize insider utility,
then we should not find a significant association. We also use a decomposition of the lowest-
median difference into the market component and the firm-specific component.
Since SOX imposes stricter reporting requirements, we use a dummy variable equal to
one if the grant was given post-SOX to control for the change in reporting requirements.
Finally, even under random selection of dates, a grant would be more likely to be lucky
when more trading dates in the month had a price equal to the lowest price level of the month.
Also, even when there is only one day with this price level, the probability that it would be
selected is lower when the month has more trading days. We therefore add an additional control
equal to the ratio of the number of days in the month of the grant with closing prices equal to the
lowest price of the month to the number of trading days in the firm’s stock in the grant month.
Table 11 displays our results. Column 1 is a pooled regression. In terms of firm
characteristics, we find that the lucky grants are more common (with 1% significance) in firms
whose relative size is smaller. Lucky grants are also more common (again, with 1% significance)
in new economy firms.
In terms of grant circumstances, grants were more likely to be lucky (at 1% significance)
before SOX. Furthermore, consistent with the possibility that the incidence of manipulation was
responsive to its potential payoffs, grants were more likely to be lucky (again, at 1%
significance) when the difference between the lowest and the median price level was large. This
result is consistent with Heron and Lie (2006b), who find that firms with higher volatility of
stock returns are more likely to time their grants. As we shall see, however, our result is driven
not only by differences in volatility across firms but also by differences over time for any given
CEO and firm in the potential payoffs from backdating.
Column 2 displays the results of a regression in which we decompose the difference
between the lowest and median price of the grant month into its market and firm-specific
components. Consistent with the results in our third test of backdating vs. spring-loading in the
preceding section, both components matter. The coefficient of each one of them is positive and
significant.
Columns 3-6 of Table 11 show the results of fixed effect regressions. Columns 3-4 are
like columns 1-2 but with firm fixed effects, and columns 5-6 correspond to 1-2 but with CEO22
fixed effects. These regressions enable us to control for all (stable) characteristics of firms and
CEOs that we do not have in our regression. The results indicate that, even after controlling for
CEO and firm fixed effects, the coefficient of the lowest-median difference remains positive and
significant. These results indicate that our findings in columns 1-2 are not all due to cross-
sectional differences, i.e., differences between firm types such as high-volatility and low-
volatility firms. For any given firm that gives multiple grants over time, grants are more likely to
be lucky in months in which the difference between the lowest and the median price is relatively
large. Similarly, for any given CEO who receives multiple grants over time, lucky grants are
more likely in months that have a higher lowest-median difference. Consistent with the results in
column 2, columns 4 and 6 indicate that both the market component and the firm-specific
component of the lowest-median price difference explain incidences of lucky grants.
B. CEO Characteristics
In this section, our main interest is in factors associated with the influence and power that
the CEO has over the directors. To the extent that backdating was merely the product of a
rational business decision by the firm to provide non-performance compensation in this form, the
incidence of lucky grants should not be expected to correlate with such factors. However, if
backdating was produced by agency problems and governance failures, then lucky grants can be
expected to correlate with such factors.
For the analysis in this section, we rely on CEO variables that are available in the
ExecuComp dataset, which restricts our sample to about 6,000 observations.
We begin with the regression specification in (4), and we add to it CEO characteristics in
two steps. Our results are presented in the first three columns of Table 12. Column 1 of the table
presents the results of a regression that begins with the benchmark specification of Table 11 and
adds to it two CEO characteristics. The first is tenure of the CEO in the firm (in logs). The longer
the tenure, the more influence the CEO is likely to have on directors and internal pay practices
(e.g., Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999), Cyert, Kang, and Kumar (2002), Harford and Lie
(2006)). As column 1 indicates, the coefficient of this variable is positive and significant at 1%
level, consistent with the view that a longer tenure makes grants more likely to be lucky.
The second variable, Outsider, is a dummy variable for whether the CEO came to the
position from outside the company. An outside CEO is expected, at least initially, to have less23
influence on the directors and the firm's internal pay process and be more cautious about using
practices that might be regarded as aggressive. The coefficient on Outsider in Column 1's
regression is indeed negative, but it is not statistically significant from zero.
Since the influence on directors and internal processes of a, say, CEO with a five-year
tenure, is unlikely to depend significantly on whether the CEO was initially hired from the
outside or inside, we investigate the possible significance of Outsider in a second way. In the
regression reported in Column 2, we replace tenure with two different variables – tenure for
CEOs hired from the outside and tenure for CEOs hired from the inside. Our conjecture is that
tenure is more critical for obtaining familiarity with and influence over the firm's internal
processes for CEOs hired from the outside. Consistent with this view, we find that the coefficient
of tenure is higher for outside CEOs than for inside CEOs in a large and statistically significant
way. The coefficient of tenure for insiders is still positive and significant at 5%, indicating that
tenure still matters for inside CEOs, albeit less than for outside CEOs.
Our next step is to see whether the CEO's ownership stake is correlated with the CEO's
chances of getting lucky grants. The relation between executive ownership and various aspects of
firm performance and behavior has been explored in the past in different contexts (for example,
McConnell, and Servaes, 1995; Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1988; Holderness and Sheehan,
1988). To explore this issue, we introduce two dummy variables: one for CEOs with more than
5% but less than 25% stock ownership, and one for CEOs with more than 25%. Column 3
displays the results of the logit regression, including these variables. We find that grants to CEOs
with stakes between 5% and 25% are more likely (with 5% significance) to be lucky. This result
should be treated with caution because the coefficient remains positive but loses its significance
in subsequent regressions in which director independence is added.
C. Director Independence
The final variables we add are taken from the IRRC dataset and measure director
independence. Because our interest is in examining whether lucky grants are more likely in the
presence of factors associated with greater influence of the CEO on directors, such variables are
naturally relevant.
Director independence has been viewed as an instrument of improving board oversight in
general and oversight over executive compensation in particular. Case law has therefore long24
encouraged, and recent stock exchanges require, independent compensation committees.
Similarly, having a majority of independent directors on the board has been long considered a
good governance practice and has been recently mandated by stock exchange requirements.
While formal independence requirements are not sufficient to eliminate CEO influence on
directors (Bebchuk and Fried (2004)), they reduce it.
We therefore add to our regressions dummy variables for whether the board has an
independent compensation committee and for whether the board has a majority of independent
directors. Our results are displayed in the last three columns of Table 12. Column 4 of Table 12
uses only the independent committee dummy; column 5 uses only the independent board
dummy; and column 6 uses both.
The coefficient on the independent board dummy is negative and significant at the 1%
level both when the independent compensation committee dummy is and is not included. This
result indicates a correlation between lucky grants and boards that lack a majority of independent
directors. The size of the coefficient implies that having a majority of independent directors on
the board reduces the odds of a lucky grant by 1-exp(-0.411)=33%. Thus, grant manipulation
might be one of the contexts in which having a majority of independent directors makes a
difference.
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In contrast, the coefficient on the independent compensation committee dummy is not
significant either with or without the board independence dummy. It might be that a lack of
majority of independent directors on the board as a whole weakens the position of outside
directors and thus undermines their effectiveness even when they serve on independent
committees. This view is partly reflected in the exchanges' decisions to require a majority of
independent directors on the board as a whole and not only the independence of key committees
such as audit, nomination, and compensation.
Finally, we should note that the significance of tenure does not go away (or even
substantially change in magnitude) when director independence variables are added. This result
is consistent with the widespread view that the presence or absence of a majority of formally
14 As noted in the introduction, while research has not found a link between board independence and
better corporate performance in general, it has identified some specific types of decisions for which such
independence matters (e.g., Cotter, Shivdasani, and Zenner (1997), Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2006)).25
independent directors on the board does not fully determine the extent to which the board is truly
independent of the CEO in making compensation and oversight decisions.
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D. Serial Luck
The preceding subsections have identified a number of variables that are correlated with
lucky grants. Undoubtedly, there are CEO and firm traits that could affect the incidence of lucky
grants but were not included. Indeed, characteristics such as aspects of the CEO's personality and
the firm's compensation staff might be difficult or impossible for researchers to observe.
However, to the extent that such traits exist, one would expect luck to be "serial" or "persistent".
That is, controlling for all the variables thus far used, one would still expect a grant to be more
likely to be lucky if a preceding grant was lucky. Such persistence would not be expected, of
course, under random selection.
To examine the existence and magnitude of such persistence, we re-run the regressions in
Tables 12 and 13, but this time add two dummy variables. One dummy variable is equal to one
when the CEO has a preceding grant in our dataset and it was lucky. The other dummy variable
is equal to one if the CEO has a preceding grant in our dataset, and it was not lucky. (Our default
is therefore executive grants that were not preceded in our dataset by another grant to the same
executive.)
Table 13 displays the results of all the key regressions with the two dummy variables
added to them. In all the regressions, the coefficient of the previous lucky dummy is positive and
significant at the 1% level. The coefficient is on the order of 0.6, which implies that having a
preceding grant that was lucky increases the odds of a CEO's current grant being lucky by 82%
(relative to a CEO for whom we have no information whether the previous executive grant was
lucky). In contrast, the coefficient on the dummy for having a preceding grant that was not lucky
(which lumps together all other price ranks, including preceding grants at the second-lowest
price of the month) is negative but not statistically significant in all the regressions. Thus, our
results indicate that there are additional factors beyond those identified by us that make lucky
grants more likely even though those factors are not expected to influence the probability of luck
15 In addition to director independence, there might well be other characteristics of serving directors that
might be relevant to the odds of lucky grants and that our analysis does not identify. In particular, in a
current study that complements our work, Bizjak, Lemmon, and Whitby (2006) show a link between the
spread of option backdating and interlocking directors.26
under random selection. Identifying such additional factors might be a worthwhile task for future
research.
E. Zeroing in on Manipulated Grants
The results in this section identify several variables that are associated with an increased
likelihood of a grant being lucky even though these variables cannot be expected to have such an
effect in the absence of manipulation. Thus, pools of grants with these characteristics can be
expected to have more incidents of lucky grants with a higher fraction of them owing their status
to manipulation. That is, our results enable us to identify pools of lucky grants that are especially
likely to have been manipulated.
Table 14 displays results with respect to classes of grants that according to our analysis
can be expected to display a high probability of being unexpectedly lucky. We form such classes
by focusing on three key variables: 1) The highest volatility quartile (decile), with volatility
defined as before as the difference between the lowest and the median price in the grant's month.
2) A dummy variable that equals one if the CEO received a previous grant that was lucky. 3)
Lack of an independent board, a variable  that is only available for a subset of firms with IRRC
data available.
The first column of Table 14 shows the number of observations per class, the second
column displays the actual number of lucky grants, and the third column shows the ratio of
actual lucky grants to total number of observations. The fourth and fifth columns display our
estimate of the percentage of lucky grants in the pool of grants that were manipulated and of the
number of manipulated grants in the pool. Panel A shows statistics for the pre-SOX period, and
panel B for the post-SOX period.
Pre-SOX, in our sample as a whole, 55% of all lucky grants were unexpectedly granted at
the lowest price and thus can be estimated to have been manipulated. However, in the class of
grants with the highest volatility quartile (decile), this fraction increases to 71% (76%). In the
class of pre-SOX grants that were preceded by lucky grants, we estimate that 74% of the lucky
grants owed their status to manipulation. Finally, in the class of pre-SOX grants by companies
that lacked a majority of independent directors, 65% of the lucky granted are estimated to have27
been manipulated.
16 When we put together the three variables to create a pool of grants that have
at least one of the above three variables (high volatility, preceding lucky grant, or lack of board
independence), we obtain a pool of about 4,000 grants in which 19% of the grants (761 grants)
were lucky with 69% of the lucky grants (524 grants) estimated to have been manipulated.
We next look at the pool of grants that have at least two of the variables we focus on. The
pool of lucky grants defined in this way has an especially high fraction of unexpected,
manipulated grants. Indeed, when being in the highest volatility decile is used for defining the
pool, we obtain a pool of lucky grants out of which 83% are expected to have been manipulated.
Finally, panel B displays the results of such an analysis for post-SOX grants. Because the
incidence of lucky grants is lower post-SOX, the pools of post-SOX lucky grants are smaller.
However, the results enable us to identify also post-SOX pools with a high incidence of lucky
grants (relative to the post-SOX sample as a whole), and thus pools of lucky grants in which the
fraction of manipulated grants is high.
V. LUCKAROUND THEECONOMY
A. Luck in and out of the New Economy
Because most of the backdating cases that have thus far been uncovered involve new
economy firms, there is a widespread impression that grant date manipulation was concentrated
in the new economy sector (see, e.g., Walker (2006)). While the regressions reported earlier
indicate that a new economy classification increases the likelihood of a grant being lucky, they
do not indicate that such classification is a critical factor. Other factors -- such as the difference
between the month's lowest and median price, the CEO's tenure, and director independence –
also have explanatory power over whether a grant is lucky.
Looking at the regression results, however, we cannot rule out the possibility that
manipulated grants are concentrated in new economy firms. It might be that firms with large
differences between the grant month's lowest and median prices are mainly new economy firms,
and thus most of the manipulated grants involve new economy firms. We explore this question
16 In Table 14, the number of pre-SOX lucky grants by companies without a majority of independent
directors (and the subset of manipulated lucky grants by such companies) is small relative to the size of
the other classes reported because we have data about director independence only for the limited subset of
companies for which IRRC data are available.28
by replicating our estimation of the incidence of manipulated grants but do so for the set of new
and old economy firms separately, following the classification into new versus old economy firm
of Murphy (2003).
The results are shown in Table 15, and they indicate that grant manipulation was not
practiced largely limited to the new economy. While the incidence of manipulation is somewhat
smaller among old economy (48% of actual grants) firms than among new economy firms
(59%), most of the manipulated grants did take place in old economy firms. In particular, out of
the estimated 1,163 manipulated grants for the sample as a whole (see Table 6), we estimate that
944 (more than 80%) involve grants given by old economy firms.
Similarly, the incidence of firms providing one or manipulated grants is smaller among
old economy firms (12%) than it is among new economy firms (16%); and the incidence of
CEOs receiving one or more manipulated lucky grants is smaller among old economy CEOs
(9%) than it is among new economy CEOs (12%). Again, however, given the much larger
number of old economy firms, more than 80% of the firms providing and the CEOs receiving
manipulated lucky grants were from the old economy. Taken together, these findings indicate
that grant manipulation has not been largely or even primarily limited to new economy firms
Given the above findings, the question that naturally arises is why the firms that have
thus far come under scrutiny have been disproportionately new economy firms. Our conjecture is
that, while the use of manipulated grants has not been concentrated in new economy firms, such
firms might have been especially aggressive in their use of such manipulation. The companies
that have become the focus of investigation thus far are the ones in which the abnormal returns
before and after the grant date were especially salient and pronounced. Thus, to the extent that
old economy firms were somewhat as likely to provide grants at the lowest price of the month,
but considerably less likely than new economy firms to give grants at, say, the lowest price of the
year, such a difference could have led to backdating by new economy firms being
disproportionately noticed by regulators and the media in their initial search for backdating
firms.
B. Luck by Industry
We now turn to look beyond the new/old economy division how manipulated lucky
grants vary across the economy's industries. The thousands of old economy firms that are29
publicly traded span, of course, diverse industries, and even new-economy firms span three
different industries using the twelve Fama-French Industry definition (Business Equipment,
Telecom, and Shops).
17 In this section we analyze the propensity of manipulated grants across
the twelve Fama-French Industries.
18
Table 15 shows the results of our analysis. The table is ordered by the estimated fraction
of manipulated grants in the industry. As the table displays, we find a significant incidence of
manipulated lucky grants in each of the economy's industries. The highest fraction of lucky
grants that owe their status to manipulation is in the Business Equipment and Telecom industries
(59% and 57% respectively), and the lowest fraction is in the Finance, Consumer Non-Durables,
and Manufacturing industries (32%, 34%, and 35% respectively). Notably, the fraction of lucky
grants that owe their status to manipulation is larger or equal to 50% in seven of the economy's
twelve industries (including, importantly, several industries where no new economy firms are
included).
Table 15 also shows how the twelve industries vary in terms of the incidence of firms and
CEOs providing and receiving manipulated grants. Again, we find a significant incidence of such
firms and CEOs in each of the twelve industries. The incidence of CEOs receiving manipulated
lucky grants is lowest in the Utilities, Consumer Non-Durables, and Finance industries (4%, 5%,
and 5% respectively) and highest in the Business Equipment industry (13%). The incidence of
firms providing manipulated grants is at its lowest level (6%) in the Finance industry and at its
highest level (17%) in the Business Equipment industry.
The variation across industries that we identify is not necessarily all due to "industry
effects", say, industry "norms" or "culture."
19  Industry classification might well be correlated
with factors such as stock price volatility and firm size that we have found to be correlated with
lucky grants. Thus, to investigate the extent to which the variation across industries is due to
such factors rather than "pure" industry effects, we re-run regression (5), adding industry dummy
17  They also span four different one-digit SIC code classifications (3, 4, 5, and 7).
18 The industry definitions are obtained from Ken French’s website. We also conducted an analysis of the
propensity of lucky grants across industries classified on the basis of one-digit SIC codes, and we
similarly found a significant presence of manipulated lucky grants in all industries that made significant
use of option grants (that is, all industries other than agriculture and public administration).
19 Fleischer (2006) argues that differences in corporate culture and compliance norms were likely a key
determinant for why some firms but not others engaged in grant manipulation.30
variables using the energy industry as the default group. The last column of Table 15 shows the
coefficients on the industry dummies in this regression.
We find that, once we control for stock price volatility (proxied in (5) by the difference
between the lowest and median price of the grant month) and firm size, only the Finance industry
has a probability of a lucky grant that is different to a statistically significant degree from the
Energy industry. Pair-wise F-tests further suggest that the last four industries (Manufacturing,
Utilities, Consumer Non-Durables, and Finance) all display a significantly different coefficient
from the first industry (Business Equipment). However, such tests fail to find statistically
significant differences in any other pair-wise comparisons of industries and, in particular, among
any two of the first eight industries.
20
VI. GAINS FROM LUCK
A natural question to ask is whether the gains to CEOs from manipulated timing have
been material. Some observers suggested that, notwithstanding the substantial attention accorded
to backdating and whatever legal and ethical issues they might involve, the amounts executives
directly gained from backdating were quite limited relative to the regular compensation paid to
CEOs.
21 In this section we try to assess the gains to CEOs from timing manipulation. The
estimates we derive indicate that the payoffs from timing manipulation were hardly insignificant.
Surely, we do not know for certain which grants had their timing manipulated, but we
have been able to identify a pool of grants where a large fraction of grants was likely
manipulated. In particular, we have shown that a large fraction of the grants given in one of the
three lowest prices, especially the lowest price, had their timing manipulated. So it is worth
20  For the sub-sample where we also have governance data, we also ran a regression (not shown) similar
to that in Table 12 except that we added the industry dummies. Again, we found that, after controlling for
CEO and firm governance characteristics, some industry differences remain but that most industries are
not statistically distinguishable in terms of lucky grant odds.
21  See, e.g., Walker (2006). He goes on to suggest that while the direct effect of the backdating (taking
the number of options granted as given) on the value of the grant was small, CEOs might have gained
because the backdating of fixed-value grants resulted in a larger number of options being given. For a
similar view expressed by the media, see Gary Rivlin and Eric Dash, "Silicon Valley Firms Scrutinized
on Stock Option Policies," New York Times, July 22, 2006.31
estimating the potential gain that a CEO would have derived from having a grant placed in this
pool opportunistically, assuming the grant was indeed manipulated.
22
Table 16 reports such estimates. We first calculate the value of each grant in the
considered pool, assuming it was indeed granted on the date reported using the parameters given
in the Thomson database for the grant date, maturity date, strike price, and the number of options
granted.
23 Assuming the grant was manipulated, we then compute and show the average ratios of
three benchmark estimates of the value that the grant in fact had to the receiving CEO relative to
the estimated option value at the grant date. One comparison benchmark is the value the option
had, assuming it was in fact granted not on the reported date but on a date in the grant month in
which the price was equal to the month's median price. The second comparison benchmark is the
expected value that the grant had, assuming it was granted not on the reported date but on a
randomly selected day during the grant month (that is, assuming it was given on any of these
days with the same probability).
24 The third benchmark comparison is to the value that the CEO's
option had at the end of the grant month.
25 We report ratios of the benchmarks to the actual grant
value in the first three rows and the number of observations below.
We do these calculations separately for grants in the three pools of lucky grants: grants at
the lowest price of the month, grants at the second-lowest price, and grants at the third-lowest
price. These results are displayed in the first three columns of Table 16. We find that the three
methods yield very similar results. Lucky grants that were manipulated had a value to the
executive that was 20%-21% higher than the grant-date value calculated under the assumption of
truthful reporting. By the end of the grant month, manipulated lucky grants had a value that was
21% higher than their value assuming truthful reporting. Assuming that the actual grant date had
22  While Narayanan, Schipani, and Seyhun (2006) and Walker (2006) calculate the potential gains to
executives in some of the cases that have come under scrutiny thus far, we attempt below to estimate the
gains to executives in the whole pool of manipulated lucky grants.
23 In order to calculate Black-Scholes values, we use the 3-month T-bill rate as the risk free rate; , and as a
proxy for volatility, we use the standard deviation of daily returns in the year prior to the grant. Grants
with fewer than 30 days of stock returns in the previous year are excluded.
24 This value is computed as the average over Black-Scholes option values in the grant month, where the
daily option values are based on the strike price of the actual grant but the stock price is the price of the
particular day of the month. All other parameters are held constant.
25 This value is computed using the strike price of the actual grant and the stock price at the last trading
day of the month.32
a median price or that the grant date was randomly selected, the value of the grant to the CEO
was 20% higher than its value under accurate reporting.
Our estimates for the gains from manipulations, placing grants in the second-lowest and
third-lowest price categories, also yield significant (though naturally lower) figures. We estimate
the typical gain to a CEO from a grant in the second-lowest price category that was manipulated
to be 12%-14%. For grants in the third-lowest category, our estimate for the typical gain is 9%-
11% of the value of the grants assuming accurate reporting of the grant date.
One aspect of our findings makes the above estimates significantly conservative. In two
of our estimation methods, we assume that manipulated grants were moved to their reported date
from a date with the median price or from a randomly selected date. Our earlier results (see
Table 6 on the estimated incidence of manipulation in each price rank category) indicate that,
other things equal, a manipulated grant at the bottom of the price distribution was more likely to
have been moved from a date with a price at the high part of the month's price distribution than
from a date in the middle part of this distribution. To assess the potential significance of this
source of under-valuation, the three last columns of Table 16 provide estimates of the gain to a
CEO from moving the reported date of a grant given in a day with one of the highest three prices
of the month from the actual date to a date with the month's median price, to a randomly selected
date, or to the month's last trading day. These gains turn out to be significant, yielding 6%-10%
of the grant's value assuming accurate reporting, depending on the scenario and method used.
Thus, because we do not attempt to add gains of this type to our calculation of the gains from
manipulated grants at the bottom of the price distribution, our estimates are conservative and
likely understate the level of gains.
There is another aspect of our findings that makes our estimates of percentage under-
reporting quite conservative. Not knowing which grants in the lucky grants pool were
manipulated, we assume that the manipulated grants in this pool are similar in characteristics to
the other (non-manipulated) grants in the pool. However, our results suggest that manipulation
might have been more likely to occur when the difference between the lowest and the median
price was high, which operates to increase the percentage appreciation in grant value due to
backdating to the month's lowest price.
The next three rows, labeled dollar underreporting, translate the typical gains from a
manipulated grant into dollar terms (expressed in 2005 dollars using the CPI index). For lucky33
grants that were manipulated, our estimate of the dollar gain to the CEO ranges (depending on
the method) from 1.4 to 1.7 million dollars. With respect to this estimate, we should caution that
a smaller firm size and smaller grant value of manipulated grants vs. other grants in the pool of
lucky grants work in the direction of over-estimation.
The final three rows present an estimate of the ratio of a CEO's gain from a manipulated
grant in one of three prices at the bottom of the distribution to the total compensation of the
CEO. Total compensation is from ExecuComp (the tdc1 variable), and hence reduces the sample
to those companies for which we have data from ExecuComp. To derive this estimate, we take
the Black-Scholes value of the options reported by ExecuComp, and use our methods for
estimating the percentage of this value that the CEO gained assuming the grant was manipulated.
We then estimate the average ratio of such (unreported) gains to total reported compensation and
get estimates of 9%-10%.  Recalling the factors that made our estimation method for the
percentage by which manipulated grants were under-reported conservative, we believe that these
estimates are conservative and likely significantly under-stated. Thus, our estimates enable
rejecting the possibility raised by some that backdating gains might have been insignificant
relative to CEOs' regular compensation.
VII. REPORTED COMPENSATION AND GAINS FROMLUCKY GRANTS
We next explore the total reported compensation that was awarded to CEOs who got
grants that present a substantial likelihood of having been manipulated. In particular, we seek to
examine the view that backdating has been used by firms as a tax-efficient form of non-
performance pay. On this view, backdating gains could have been an attractive form of
compensation, because they enabled providing non-performance pay that was not subject to the
$1 million limitation of tax deductibility under section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code.
That is, (un-reported) backdating gains are conjectured to have been used by some companies as
a tax-efficient substitute for other forms of compensation. A finding that firms using this form of
substitute compensation have paid lower compensation through other sources (relative to peer
companies) would be consistent with this view. Below, we therefore test whether, controlling for
standard controls, total reported compensation was lower for CEOs who were the recipients of
lucky grants.34
Table 17 presents regression results for the sub-sample of CEOs for whom data are
available in ExecuComp. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of total compensation
(tdc1) from ExecuComp. In columns 1 and 2, the independent variables of interest are a dummy
for lucky equal to one if the grant was given at the lowest price of the month. In columns 3 and
4, the independent variable of interest is called relative luck, and is defined as the gain from luck
in the event the grant is lucky (which is thus zero when the grant is not lucky) divided by total
reported compensation.
26
We control for other known determinants of the level of compensation, namely: the
standard deviation of the daily stock returns in the year prior to the fiscal year where the grant
was given; the log of the book value of assets; the firm's return on assets; industry-adjusted
Tobin’s Q; the firm's leverage; and the firm's stock returns in the year of compensation and
(separately) the prior year; and a dummy for whether the firm is a new economy firm. In the
regressions reported in columns 2 and 4, CEO age and tenure are from ExecuComp and are
added as additional controls for CEO characteristics from the second regression onwards.
We cluster the errors by CEOs. As before, clustering the errors enables us to correct for
potential correlations across the levels of compensation among the same CEOs.
The coefficient on lucky is positive and significant (at the 5% level), enabling us to reject
the prediction that firms granting options at the lowest price of the month paid lower
compensation through other sources. The conclusion is similar using relative gains from luck,
whose coefficient is also positive and significant at the 10% level; the higher a CEO's gain (if
any) from receiving a lucky grant, the higher the CEO's total compensation from other, reported
sources. We thus fail to find evidence that supports the view that gains from grant manipulation
were provided to CEOs as a substitute for, and reduced the total amount of, other forms of
compensation.
We also conduct another test to examine whether firms paying a salary of one million
dollars or more were more likely to provide lucky grants. For such firms, the $1 million dollar
limitation on tax deductibility of nonperformance compensation is a binding constraint. Thus, to
the extent that backdating was in part motivated by a desire to provide nonperformance pay
26 The results displayed in the table use our first method of estimating gains from luck (see Table 16),
which assumes that manipulated lucky grants were in fact given in a day with a price equal to the month's
median. Using the other methods, all the regressions in the table yield similar results to those displayed.35
without going beyond the 162(m) limitation, one would expect lucky grants to be used more in
such firms. We test for the presence of such a correlation. However, we find no significant
correlation between lucky grants and a dummy equal to one if the salary is $1 million or above
(coefficient of -0.001 with a p-value of 0.92) controlling for the same firm and CEO
characteristics as reported in Table 17. Similarly, we do not find a higher likelihood of lucky
grants for firms paying a salary between $950 thousand and $1 million. Thus, this test also does
not provide support for the view that backdating could be explained as an attempt to provide
nonperformance compensation in a tax-efficient way that avoided section 162(m) penalties.
What explains the identified positive correlation between abnormal compensation and
lucky grants? One possible explanation is that CEOs with greater influence over their own pay
have been more likely both to obtain manipulated lucky grants and to receive higher
compensation from other sources. Another (not mutually exclusive) explanation is that the
payment of higher compensation than in peer companies provided greater motivation to shifting
some compensation to forms of compensation below the radar screen (including through
manipulated grants). More work needs to be done to disentangle these and other possible
explanations. For now, we can just reject the conjecture that grant manipulation was used by
otherwise similar firms with the shareholder-regarding aim of providing non-performance pay in
a tax-efficient way.
VIII. SUPER-LUCKY GRANTS
We have thus far focused on grants awarded at the lowest price of the grant month. To
the extent that opportunistic timing has been due to backdating, however, it is possible that firms
mis-dated grants within a period longer than a calendar month. In this section we examine lucky
grants that were "super-lucky," defined as having a grant price at the lowest price of the calendar
quarter in which the grant was reported to have been awarded.
Table 18, Panel A displays statistics concerning the incidence of super-lucky grants. In
the overall sample period, we find 992 grants (5.2% of all grants) that were super-lucky. Out of
the set of lucky grants (see Table 6), 42% were super-lucky (992 out of 2,329 grants).
Furthermore, comparing the number of actual super-lucky grants with the estimated number of
such grants, we estimate that about 610 super-lucky grants (62% of all such grants) were
manipulated.36
As in the case of manipulated lucky grants, we find that most of the manipulated super-
lucky grants were awarded by old economy firms. As Table 18 indicates, we estimate that about
470 super-lucky grants in old economy firms (59% of all super-lucky grants in such firms) were
manipulated. A similar estimation for new economy firms indicates that about 71% of the super-
lucky grants awarded by them were manipulated. Thus, while new economy firms display a
somewhat higher propensity of manipulation, old economy firms do not fall far behind, and,
given their larger proportion in the population, are associated with most of the manipulated
super-lucky grants.
Table 18, Panel B shows statistics by CEO and firm, similar to the ones shown in Table 7
for lucky grants. As the table indicates, we estimate that about 7% of CEOs received one or more
super-lucky grants due to manipulation. Similarly, about 11% of firms provided at least one
super-lucky grant due to manipulation. In untabulated results, we find the pattern to be similar in
both old and new economy firms.
Given that there is an increased fraction of manipulated grants among super-lucky grants,
we also display classes of grants formed by volatility (quartile and decile), whether the preceding
grant was lucky, and whether the board is independent. These results are shown in Table 19 for
pre-SOX grants. Using super-lucky grants, we can identify groups of grants that consist of
manipulated grants with a very high probability. For example, among the 423 super-lucky grants
by firms in the highest volatility quartile, we estimate that 88% have been manipulated. An 87%
proportion of manipulated grants is estimated to exist in the pool of super-lucky grants by firms
without a majority of independent directors. An even higher fraction of manipulated grants –
92% – is estimated to exist among the 189 super-lucky grants that were preceded by a lucky
grant. If we put together in one pool all the super-lucky grants that have one or more of the three
above characteristics – volatility in the highest quartile, a preceding lucky grant, or a lack of
independent board – we obtain a pool of 600 grants out of which 88% are estimated to have been
manipulated.
IX. CONCLUSION
We have investigated in this paper the opportunistic timing of options during the period
1996-2005, focusing on the ranking of grant-date prices within the price distribution of the grant37
month. Opportunistic timing increases the incidence of grants at the bottom of the price
distribution – and especially at the lowest price of the month. The price-rank of a grant, and in
particular whether the grant was given at the lowest price of the month, provide a useful tool for
investigating the incidence, causes, and consequences of grant manipulation.
Using this proxy we are able to identify various factors that contribute to the
manipulation of some grants but not others. In particular, we identify a link between
manipulation and governance. Lucky grants are more likely to occur when the firm lacks a
majority of independent directors and when the CEO has longer tenure, both factors associated
with greater CEO influence on the company's pay-setting and governance processes. Relatedly,
we find that CEOs receiving lucky grants also receive total compensation from other sources that
is higher relative to peer firms, thus finding no evidence that extra gains from grant timing
manipulation was used by firms as a substitute for other compensation forms.
We also document a link between timing manipulation and the potential payoffs from it.
Not only is manipulation more common in firms with higher stock price volatility, but it is also
more likely to occur, for a given CEO and firm, in months in which the potential gain from it is
higher relative to other times. Our analysis also highlights the existence of serial luck. Luck is
persistent with CEOs more likely being lucky in their next grant when their prior grant was
lucky. This finding indicates that, beyond the factors we identify, there might be other systematic
factors that underlay timing manipulation, and future research might seek to identify them.
Finally, we have used the incidence of grants at different price-ranks to derive estimates
of the incidence and gains from manipulation. Among other things, we find substantial fractions
of lucky grants being manipulated, as well as significant fractions of all CEOs and firms
receiving or granting manipulated lucky grants. By providing estimates of the substantial
incidence of lucky grants, firms, and CEOs in old economy firms, our analysis dispels the
impression that grant manipulation is concentrated in new economy firms. Furthermore, we find
that the gains to CEOs receiving manipulated lucky grants are material relative to the non-
manipulated grant value and their annual compensation from other sources, and we provide an
estimate for these gains.38
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TABLE 1: DISTRIBUTION OF GRANT-DAY PRICES BY RANK
The table shows the distribution of grant-date prices relative to prices during the month in which the options are granted. The sample consists of 19036 option
grants to insiders between 1996-2005, and is taken from Thomson Financial’s insider-transaction database. Lucky are grants whose grant-date price is the lowest
price of the month in which the options were granted. Grants that are denoted  2
nd lowest – 5
th lowest are grants whose grant-date price is the 2
nd – 5
th lowest price
of the month in which the options are granted. Grants that are denoted Highest – 5
th highest , are grants whose grant-date price is the highest – 5
th highest in the
month in which the options are granted. Grants Below median and Grants Above median are grants whose grant-date price is lower and higher than the median
price of the month in which the options were granted respectively. Grants Before SOX are ones whose grant date is before September 1, 2002, and grants after




































1996 1348  16% 13%  12%  10%  9% 8%  9%  8%  7%  4% 54%  34%  20%
1997 1672  16% 10%  9%  10%  8% 8%  8%  8%  7%  5% 55%  35%  20%
1998 1692 13% 10%  9%  8% 9% 6% 7% 6% 5%  5% 55%  36%  19%
1999 1584 15% 10%  8%  8% 7% 7% 6% 5% 5%  4% 56%  36%  20%
2000 1879 15% 10%  8%  8% 7% 5% 7% 6% 5%  4% 58%  35%  23%
2001 2326 15% 9%  8%  8%  7% 5% 4% 4% 4%  4% 61%  34% 27%
2002 2062 10% 7%  7%  6%  6% 5% 4% 3% 4%  4% 57%  38% 19%
2003 2164  9%  7%  7%  6%  6% 4% 5% 4% 4%  4% 55%  38% 17%
2004 2219  8%  8%  6%  5%  5% 5% 5% 5% 4%  5% 53%  43% 10%
2005 2090  8%  6%  6%  5%  6% 6% 5% 4% 5%  5% 51%  45%  6%
Before  SOX  11998 15% 10%  9% 8% 7%  6%  6%  6%  5%  4%  57% 35%  22%
After  SOX  7038  8%  7% 6% 5% 6% 5%  5%  4%  4%  5%  53%  42%  11%
Overall  19036 12%  9% 8% 7% 7% 6%  6%  5%  5%  4% 56%  38%  18%42
TABLE 2: DISTRIBUTION OF GRANT-DAY RANK BY CEO AND FIRM
The table shows the distribution of grant-date prices relative to prices during the month in which the options are granted. Panel A shows the percentage of CEOs
who had at least one grant whose grant-date price was at the three lowest, the three highest, the lowest, or the highest price of the month, respectively. The
distribution is shown separately for CEOs who received one grant in our sample, two grants, three grants, etc. Panel B shows the distribution separately for firms
that granted one grant, two grants, three grants, etc. The sample consists of 19036 option grants to insiders between 1996-2005, and is taken from Thomson
Financial’s insider-transaction database. Grants Before SOX are ones whose grant date is before September 1, 2002, and grants after SOX are ones whose grant
date is on or after September 1, 2002.
PANEL A: BY CEO
Grants  per  CEO  Number  of  CEOs  Percent  of  CEOs
who had at least





who had at least




Difference  Percent  of  CEOs
who had at least




who had at least




1 4510 32% 16% 16% 14% 5% 9%
2 1874 47% 28% 19% 20% 9% 11%
3 1050 58% 34% 24% 29% 11% 18%
4 549 70% 42% 28% 39% 15% 24%
Larger than 4 837 81% 55% 26% 51% 23% 28%
Total 8820 45% 26% 19% 22% 9% 13%
PANEL B: BY FIRM
Grants  per  Firm  Number  of  Firms  Percent  of  firms
that had at least





that had at least




Difference  Percent  of  firms
that had at least




that had at least




1 1880 36% 17% 19% 16% 4% 8%
2 1106 52% 29% 23% 23% 9% 14%
3 860 60% 36% 24% 30% 12% 18%
4 569 69% 48% 21% 37% 15% 22%
Larger than 4 1404 84% 57% 27% 52% 25% 27%
Total 5819 58% 35% 23% 30% 12% 18%43
TABLE 3: FIRM, CEO, AND GRANT CHARACTERISTICS
Panel A compares averages of financial and governance characteristics of grants whose strike price was the
lowest during the month (Lucky) and other grants (Not Lucky). Panel B displays the incidence of Lucky
grants among various categories of grants. Option grant information is from the Thomson Financials insider
trading database. Stock return and market cap data fare taken from the CRSP database. Other financial and
governance characteristics are taken from the IRRC and the ExecuComp database. Market capitalization is
the market value of equity, calculated at the end of the month in which the option was granted. Relative
size is the market cap of equity divided by the median market cap of firms in the sample for that year. New
Economy refers to firms that belong to a new economy industry, as defined in Murphy (2003). Grants
Before SOX are ones whose grant date is before September 1, 2002, and grants after SOX are ones whose
grant date is on or after September 1, 2002. CEO from outside is a dummy variable that equals one if the
CEO was not employed by the firm before getting into the CEO position. Independent Board dummy
equals one if the majority of the directors on the board are independent. Previously lucky is a dummy
variable that equals one if the grant that the CEO received before the current grant was a lucky grant. A
firm might have more than one observation if its CEO received more than one grant in the sample.
PANEL A: DIFFERENCE IN FIRM AND CEO CHARACTERISTICS
Lucky  Not  Lucky Difference
Relative size (market cap divided by median cap for the year) 5.32  8.69  ***
New Economy 17%  14%  ***
Difference between the median and lowest price in the grant
month 13.1%  10.1%  ***
After SOX 25%  39%  ***
CEO from outside 18% 17%
CEO Tenure (in years) 7.55  6.41  ***
CEO fractional equity ownership 3% 2% ***
Independent Board dummy 77%  85%  ***
Independent compensation committee dummy 95% 97%
Preceding grant lucky 9.5%  5.5%  ***
Observations 2359 16660
PANEL B: DIFFERENCE IN LIKELIHOOD OF LUCKY GRANTS
Variable   %  Lucky  Difference Variable
Company size below median    14%  11%  *** Company size above median
New Economy  15% 12% *** Not new economy
High (top quartile) difference
 between lowest and median price  17% 10% ***
Low (bottom quartile) difference
between lowest and median price
 Before SOX  15% 8% *** After SOX
 CEO from Inside    10%  11%  CEO from Outside
Tenure >=5  11% 9% ***  Tenure <5
CEO fractional equity ownership
‡5%  16%  9% ***
CEO fractional equity ownership
<5%
No  majority  of  independent  directors   14%  9%  *** Majority of independent directors
Non-independent compensation
committee  13%  9% *
Independent compensation
committee
Preceding grant lucky  15%  9% *** Preceding grant not lucky44
TABLE 4: LIKELIHOOD OF A DAY BEING SELECTED AS A GRANT DATE
For each firm that granted options, the sample consists of all dates during the month where the option was
granted. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm granted an option on that
particular date and zero otherwise. Grants Before SOX are ones whose grant date is before September 1,
2002, and grants after SOX are ones whose grant date is on or after September 1, 2002. Three lowest prices
of the month and Three highest prices are dummy variables that equal one if the grant-date price was one of
the three lowest prices of the month and three highest prices of the month, respectively, and zero otherwise.
The coefficients shown are from a logit regression. *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% level, respectively. The numbers in parentheses are the estimated standard errors of the coefficients,
adjusted for clustering at the executive level.
Intercept -3.072 *** -3.072 ***
(0.010)  (0.010)




of the Month -0.179 ***
(0.022)
Three Lowest * Before SOX 0.585 ***
 (0.019)
Three Lowest * After SOX 0.406 ***
 (0.028)
Three Highest * Before SOX -0.238 ***
 (0.026)
Three Highest * After SOX -0.064 ***
  (0.034)
Observations 391844  39184445
TABLE 5: PRECISE RANK AND THE LIKELIHOOD
OF SELECTION AS A GRANT DATE
The regression is similar to the regression in Table 4, except that the independent variables are dummies for
whether the price on the grant date was the lowest, 2
nd lowest, 3
rd lowest, etc. *, **, *** represent
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The numbers in parentheses are the estimated
standard errors of the coefficients, adjusted for clustering at the executive level.
Intercept -3.1092 *** Intercept -3.1105 ***
(0.009) (0.010)
Lucky   (lowest) 0.8849 *** Lucky  (lowest) * Before Sox 1.0035 ***
(0.028) (0.031)
2nd   lowest 0.4261 *** 2nd   lowest *Before Sox 0.4639 ***
(0.029) (0.032)
3rd   lowest 0.2737 *** 3rd   lowest *Before Sox 0.2786 ***
(0.030) (0.034)
4th   lowest 0.169 *** 4th   lowest *Before Sox 0.2112 ***
(0.031) (0.035)
5th   lowest 0.1457 *** 5th   lowest *Before Sox 0.1435 ***
(0.031) (0.036)
5th highest -0.1332 *** 5th highest *Before Sox -0.1882 ***
(0.032) (0.039)
4rd highest -0.0884 *** 4rd highest *Before Sox -0.1302 ***
(0.032) (0.038)
3rd highest -0.1838 *** 3rd highest *Before Sox -0.2048 ***
(0.034) (0.040)
2nd highest -0.189 *** 2nd highest *Before Sox -0.2213 ***
(0.036) (0.042)
Highest -0.211 *** Highest*Before Sox -0.3395 ***
(0.039) (0.049)
Observations 391844 Lucky  (lowest) * After Sox 0.6092 ***
(0.046)
2nd   lowest *After Sox 0.3499 ***
(0.050)
3rd   lowest *After Sox 0.2769 ***
(0.051)
4th   lowest *After Sox 0.088
(0.053)
5th   lowest *After Sox 0.1714 ***
(0.053)
5th highest *After Sox -0.0245
(0.056)
4rd highest *After Sox -0.004
(0.057)
3rd highest *After Sox -0.1393 **
(0.062)
2nd highest *After Sox -0.1207 **
(0.060)
Highest * After Sox 0.0103
(0.058)
Observations 39184446
TABLE 6: ESTIMATING THE INCIDENCE OF MANIPULATED GRANTS
The table shows an estimate of the number of grant-date prices that should fall on the lowest price of the month, second lowest, third lowest, etc., if the grant date
was randomly selected. We estimate the probability of observing a grant on a particular price-rank day be counting the number of days in the month where the
price is at a given price-rank and divide it by the total number of trading days of the stock in that month. The table compares the estimate to the actual number of
grants that fall into these ranks. We also show the average ratio of the exercise price to the median stock price in the month. Grants Before SOX are ones whose


























Actual Number of Grants 1741 1177  1031 3949 1864  2875  1524 1786 682 619 485
Expected Number of Grants 785  883 919 2587 1835 3251 1841 2483 904 834 745
Actual-Expected 956 294  112  1362 29  -376 -318 -697 -222 -215 -260
(Actual-Expected)/Expected 121.80%  33.30%  12.20% 52.65%  1.60%  -11.60% -17.30% -28.07% -24.60% -25.80%  -34.90%
(Actual-Expected)/Actual 54.90% 25.00%  10.90% 34.49%  1.60%  -13.10% -20.90% -39.03% -32.50% -34.80% -53.70%
(Actual-Expected)/Total 8.00% 2.40%  0.90%  11.35% 0.20% -3.10% -2.60% -5.81% -1.80% -1.80%  -2.20%
Exercise  Price/Median  Stock  Price  0.87  0.92  0.94  0.90  0.96  1  1.03 1.09 1.07 1.09 1.12
After SOX (7038)
Actual Number of Grants 588 482 452  1522 794 3088 697 937 304 300 333
Expected Number of Grants 381 393 400  1174 803 3113 801 1148 391 384 373
Actual-Expected 207 89 52 348 -9  -25 -104 -211 -87 -84 -40
(Actual-Expected)/Expected 54.30% 22.60%  13.00% 29.64% -1.10%  -0.80% -13.00% -18.38% -22.30% -21.90% -10.70%
(Actual-Expected)/Actual 35.30% 18.50%  11.60% 22.86% -1.20%  -0.80% -15.00% -22.52% -28.70% -27.90% -11.90%
(Actual-Expected)/Total 2.90% 1.30%  0.70% 4.94% -0.10% -0.40% -1.50% -3.00% -1.20% -1.20%  -0.60%
Exercise  Price/Median  Stock  Price  0.91  0.93  0.95  0.93  0.96  1  1.04 1.07 1.05 1.07 1.08
Overall (19036)
Actual Number of Grants 2329 1659  1483 5471 2658  5963  2221 2723 986 919 818
Expected Number of Grants 1166 1276  1318 3760 2638  6364  2643 3631 1295 1218 1118
Actual-Expected 1163 383  165  1711  20  -401 -422 -908 -309 -299 -300
(Actual-Expected)/Expected 99.70% 30.00%  12.50%  45.51%  0.80%  -6.30% -16.00% -25.01% -23.90% -24.50% -26.80%
(Actual-Expected)/Actual 49.90% 23.10%  11.10%  31.27%  0.80%  -6.70% -19.00% -33.35% -31.30% -32.50% -36.70%
(Actual-Expected)/Total 6.10% 2.00%  0.90% 8.99% 0.10% -2.10% -2.20% -4.77% -1.60% -1.60%  -1.60%
Exercise  Price/Median  Stock  Price  0.88  0.92  0.94  0.91  0.96  1  1.04 1.08 1.06  1.08  1.147
TABLE 7: ESTIMATING THE INCIDENCE OF CEOS AND FIRMS
ASSOCIATED WITH MANIPULATED GRANTS
The table shows the number of CEOs in Panel A (Firms in Panel B) with one to five-and-more grants in the
sample. The third column shows the number of CEOs who receive at least one grant at the lowest price of
the month. The fourth column shows the expected number of CEOs who receive at least one grant at the
lowest price of the month. This number is computed in the following way: For CEOs with only one grant, it
is the product of 4510 (CEOs with only one grant) and the probability of observing the lowest price in the
month. This probability is equal to the number of days where the price was the lowest price of the month
divided by the total number of trading days in that month.  For CEOs with more than one grant, the
expected number of CEOs who receive at least one grant at the lowest price is equal to one minus the
probability of having each grant not being lucky. This is one minus the product of the probabilities that
each individual grant is at the lowest price.  A similar calculation is used to estimate the expected number
of firms that give at least one grant at the lowest price of the month.
Distribution of Grants by CEO



















1 4510 614 306 308 101% 50% 6.8%
2 1874 381 228 153 67% 40% 8.2%
3 1050 301 176 125 71%  42%  11.9%
4 549 212 114 98 86%  46%  17.9%
5> 837 423 258 165 64%  39%  19.7%
All 8820  1931  1082 849 78% 44% 9.6%
Distribution of Grants by Firm



















1 1880 296 138 158 114% 53% 8.4%
2 1106 254 149 105 70% 41% 9.5%
3 860 262 152 110 72%  42%  12.8%
4 569 212 125 87 70%  41%  15.3%
5> 1404 729 467 262 56%  36%  18.7%
All 5819  1753  1031 722 70%  41%  12.4%48
TABLE 8:  SPRING-LOADING VS.BACKDATING –
TEST BASED ON MONTHS WITH SMALL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN LOWEST
AND SECOND-LOWEST PRICES
The table shows logit-regression results where the dependent variable is a dummy for whether the CEO
was granted options on a particular date. The sample consists only of months in which the difference
between the lowest price and the second-lowest price is less than 1%. The sample for the first-column
regression consists of all dates during the month where the option was granted. The sample for the second-
column regression consists only of the dates in which the lowest price or the second lowest price of the
month prevails. Dummy – lowest and Dummy – second lowest equal one if the price is the lowest price of
the month and second-lowest price of the month and zero otherwise. The numbers in parentheses are the
estimated standard errors of the coefficients, adjusted for clustering at the executive level.
Intercept   -3.051 *** -2.6902 ***
 (0.015)  (0.042)
Lowest price of the month 0.582 *** 0.1661 ***
 (0.047)  (0.057)
Second-lowest price of the
month 0.381 ***
  (0.050)
Observations  119026  19368
TABLE 9: BACKDATING VS. SPRING-LOADING –
TEST BASED ON TIME OF REPORTING
For each firm that granted options, the sample consists of all dates during the month where the option was
granted. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm granted an option on that
particular date and zero otherwise. We interact each ranking dummy variable with a dummy variable for
whether the filing month with the SEC is the same as the reporting month. The coefficients are from a logit
regression. The numbers in parentheses are the estimated standard errors of the coefficients, adjusted for
clustering at the executive level.
Intercept -3.049 ***
(0.008)
Lucky*Reported same month 0.557 ***
(0.045)
Lucky*Reported next month 0.963 ***
(0.026)
Observations 39184449
TABLE 10: SPRING-LOADING VS. BACKDATING –
TEST BASED ON MARKET-WIDE MOVEMENTS
For each granted option, the sample consists of all dates during the month in which the option was granted.
The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm granted an option on that particular
date and zero otherwise. Return from grant date to end of month is the natural log of the gross stock return
from the date under consideration until the end of month. Market return from grant date to end of month is
the natural log of the gross market return from the date under consideration until the end of the month. The
market return is the CRSP value weighted return. The numbers in parentheses are the estimated standard
errors of the coefficients, adjusted for clustering at the executive level.
Intercept -2.986 *** -3.020 ***
(0.007) (0.008)
Return from grant date to end of month 0.614 ***
(0.034)
Market return from grant date to end of month 1.747 ***
(0.242)
Firm-specific return from grant date to end of month 0.585 ***
(0.036)
Observations 391844 39184450
TABLE 11: THE DETERMINANTS OF BEING LUCK – A FIRST LOOK
The table shows the logit regression results where the dependent variable is a dummy variable for whether the grant was given at the date where the lowest price
of the month prevailed and zero otherwise.  Relative size is the natural log of the ratio between the market cap of the firm at the end of the year and the median
market cap of the firms in the sample for that year. Difference between median and lowest price is the natural log of the gross return to shareholders from the
lowest price of the month in which the options were granted to the median price of that month. Market component of the median price – lowest price difference is
the natural log of gross market return from the minimum-price day to the median-price day. Firm-specific component of the median price – lowest price
difference is the total return minus the market return from the minimum-price day to the median-price day. New Economy firms are firms with SIC codes as
defined in Murphy (2003). We also control for the fraction of days in the month that have the lowest price (not shown). Due to data availability, the sample is
reduced to 18543 observations. The numbers in parentheses are the estimated standard errors of the coefficients, adjusted for clustering at the executive level
(except for the fixed effect regressions). *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Whole sample Firm fixed effect   Executive  fixed  effect
Intercept -2.363  ***  -2.375   ***
  0.048    0.049
Relative size -0.051  ***  -0.054   ***    0.156   ***  0.160   ***    0.162  ***   0.154   ***
(0.012) (0.012)  (0.046) (0.053)  (0.053) (0.046)
Difference between median and lowest price  1.190 ***    0.890   ***    0.808   ***
(0.171)  (0.250)  (0.269)
Market component of the median price – lowest price difference  2.338  ***  1.832  *  1.707  *
(0.753) (1.107) (0.959)
Firm-specific component of the median price – lowest price difference  1.147  ***  0.771  ***  0.854  ***
(0.171) (0.267) (0.251)
New Economy   0.197  ***   0.193   ***
(0.063) (0.063)
SOX -0.507  ***  -0.504   ***   -0.548   ***  -0.565   ***   -0.568   ***  -0.5458   ***
(0.052) (0.052)  (0.071) (0.084)  (0.084) (0.071)
Observations 18543 18543  18543 18543   18543 1854351
TABLE 12: GOVERNANCE AND THE DETERMINANTS OF LUCK
The table shows logit regression results where the dependent variable is a dummy variable for whether the grant was given at the date where the lowest price of
the month prevailed and zero otherwise. The sample consists of 6001 executive grant dates from Thomson financials with governance information at the firm
level from the IRRC and the ExecuComp databases. Dummy CEO Outsider equals one if the executive was not employed in the firm before becoming an
executive, and zero otherwise. Independent compensation committee dummy equals one if the compensation committee consists only of independent directors
and 0 otherwise. Independent board dummy equals one if the board has a majority of independent directors and zero otherwise. This variable is available only
from 1998 onwards. The definition of the rest of the variables appears in Table 11. The numbers in parentheses are the estimated standard errors of the
coefficients, adjusted for clustering at the executive level. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Intercept -2.963 *** -2.871 *** -2.868 *** -3.152 *** -2.673 *** -3.058 ***
(0.167) (0.171) (0.170) (0.334) (0.216) (0.334)
Relative size -0.066 ** -0.065 ** -0.057 * 0.005 -0.050 0.006
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.035) (0.033) (0.035)
New Economy 0.089 0.079 0.088 0.104 0.129 0.101
(0.134) (0.134) (0.134) (0.162) (0.153) (0.162)
SOX -0.303 *** -0.297 *** -0.275 *** -0.249 ** -0.219 * -0.202 *
(0.101) (0.102) (0.102) (0.118) (0.114) (0.119)
Market component of the median price - lowest price difference 3.890 *** 3.941 *** 3.952 *** 5.507 *** 4.476 *** 5.443 ***
(1.377) (1.379) (1.380) (1.585) (1.520) (1.584)
Firm-specific component of the median price -lowest price difference 1.663 *** 1.675 *** 1.653 *** 2.455 *** 1.437 *** 2.468 ***
(0.390) (0.387) (0.387) (0.464) (0.409) (0.464)
Dummy CEO Outsider -0.042 -0.687 ** -0.620 ** -0.377 -0.462 -0.369
(0.115) (0.294) (0.293) (0.350) (0.320) (0.347)
Tenure 0.187 ***
(0.050)
Tenure * Insider dummy 0.122 ** 0.092 0.148 ** 0.111 * 0.148 **
(0.057) (0.057) (0.071) (0.064) (0.071)
Tenure * Outsider dummy 0.434 *** 0.357 *** 0.380 *** 0.360 *** 0.375 ***
(0.114) (0.117) (0.139) (0.126) (0.138)
CEO Ownership >5% and <25% dummy 0.350 ** 0.154 0.157 0.093
(0.145) (0.191) (0.170) (0.192)
CEO Ownership >25% dummy 0.394 -0.359 0.136 -0.511
(0.333) (0.540) (0.388) (0.546)
Independent compensation committee dummy -0.393 -0.140
(0.256) (0.272)
Independent board dummy -0.404 *** -0.411 ***
(0.122) (0.145)
Observations 6001 6001 6001 4284 4284 428452
TABLE 13:  SERIAL LUCK
The table shows the logit regression results where the dependent variable is a dummy variable for whether the grant was given at the date where the lowest price of
the month prevailed and zero otherwise.  The dummy variable Previous Lucky equals one if the executive had a previous grant that was awarded on the date with
the lowest price of the month, and zero otherwise. The dummy variable Previous Unlucky equals one if the executive had a previous grant that was awarded on a
date that was not the lowest price of the month, and zero otherwise. The definition of the rest of the variables appears in Tables 11 and 12. The numbers in
parentheses are the estimated standard errors of the coefficients, adjusted for clustering at the executive level. *, **, ***  indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% levels respectively.
Intercept -2.376 *** -2.387 *** -2.888 *** -3.105 ***
(0.052) (0.053) (0.175) (0.338)
Relative size -0.050 *** -0.052 *** -0.061 ** 0.011
(0.012) (0.012) (0.029) (0.035)
New Economy 0.184 *** 0.181 *** 0.059 0.083
(0.063) (0.063) (0.134) (0.162)
SOX -0.497 *** -0.494 *** -0.289 *** -0.193
(0.053) (0.053) (0.103) (0.120)
Difference between median and lowest price 1.156
(0.170)
Market component of the median price - lowest price difference 2.216 *** 3.836 *** 5.398 ***
(0.755) (1.382) (1.586)
Firm-specific component of the median price -lowest price difference 1.117 *** 1.663 *** 2.482 ***
(0.170) (0.388) (0.464)
Dummy CEO Outsider -0.675 ** -0.369
(0.294) (0.347)
Tenure * Insider dummy 0.116 ** 0.148 **
(0.057) (0.071)
Tenure * Outsider dummy 0.419 *** 0.367 ***
(0.114) (0.138)
CEO Ownership >5% and <25% dummy 0.074
(0.193)
CEO Ownership >25% dummy -0.472
(0.546)
Independent compensation committee dummy -0.134
(0.272)
Majority of Independent directors dummy -0.409 ***
(0.145)
Previous Lucky 0.580 *** 0.577 *** 0.650 *** 0.508 ***
(0.083) 0.0831 (0.155) (0.190)
Previous Unlucky -0.070 -0.071 -0.086 -0.061
(0.051) (0.051) (0.095) (0.115)
Observations 18543 18543 6001 428453
Intercept -2.376 *** -2.387 *** -2.888 *** -3.105 ***
(0.052) (0.053) (0.175) (0.338)
Relative size -0.050 *** -0.052 *** -0.061 ** 0.011
(0.012) (0.012) (0.029) (0.035)
NewEconomy 0.184 *** 0.181 *** 0.059 0.083
(0.063) (0.063) (0.134) (0.162)
SOX -0.497 *** -0.494 *** -0.289 *** -0.193
(0.053) (0.053) (0.103) (0.120)
Difference between median and lowest price 1.156
(0.170)
Market component of the median price - lowest price difference 2.216 *** 3.836 *** 5.398 ***
(0.755) (1.382) (1.586)
Firm-specific component of the median price -lowest price difference 1.117 *** 1.663 *** 2.482 ***
(0.170) (0.388) (0.464)
Dummy CEO Outsider -0.675 ** -0.369
(0.294) (0.347)
Tenue * Insider dummy 0.116 ** 0.148 **
(0.057) (0.071)
Tenure * Outsider dummy 0.419 *** 0.367 ***
(0.114) (0.138)
CEO Ownership >5% and <25% dummy 0.074
(0.193)
CEO Ownership >25% dummy -0.472
(0.546)
Independent compensation committee dummy -0.134
(0.272)
Majority of Independent directors dummy -0.409 ***
(0.145)
Previous Lucky 0.580 *** 0.577 *** 0.650 *** 0.508 ***
(0.083) 0.0831 (0.155) (0.190)
Previous Unlucky -0.070 -0.071 -0.086 -0.061
(0.051) (0.051) (0.095) (0.115)
Observations 18543 18543 6001 428454
TABLE 14: ZEROING IN ON MANIPULATED GRANTS
This table consists of two panels that display the number of grants at the lowest price of the month
conditional on a number of variables. Those variables are: 1) Highest volatility quartile and decile.
Volatility is defined as the distance between the lowest and median price in a month. 2) Preceding grant
was lucky. This dummy variable is equal to one if the CEO’s previous grant was at the lowest price of the
month. 3) Not independent Board. This dummy is equal to one if the board is not majority independent.
The variable is only available for a subset of firms with IRRC data available. For each of these variables,
we further show statistics on subsamples depending on whether the firm is an old or new economy firm and
on relative size. Relative size is the natural log of the ratio between the market capitalization of the firm at
the end of the year and the median market capitalization of the firms in the sample for that year. The
sample is split at the median relative size by year. For the sub-sample of grants with available IRRC data,
we split the sample conditional on IRRC data being available. Panel A shows statistics for the pre-SOX
period, panel B for the post-SOX period.












 All 11998  1741 15%  55% 956
Highest volatility quartile 2969  589 20%  71% 421
Highest volatility decile 1187  279 24%  76% 211
Preceding grant was lucky 765  189 25%  74% 140
Not  independent  board  (IRRC  subset  only)  713  99  14%  60% 59
At least one of: Highest volatility quartile,
Preceding grant was lucky, Not independent
Board 4064  761 19%  69% 524
At least two of: Highest volatility quartile,
Preceding grant was lucky, Not independent
Board 375  111 30%  82% 91
At least two of: Highest volatility decile,
Preceding grant was lucky, Not independent
Board 183  59 32% 83% 4955
TABLE 14 (continued)












  All 7038  588 8%  35% 207
Highest volatility quartile 1780  197 11%  53% 105
Highest volatility decile 709  101 14%  64% 65
Preceding grant was lucky 486  53 11% 51% 27
Not  independent  board  (IRRC  subset  only)  136  19  14%  65% 12
At least one of: Highest volatility quartile,
Preceding grant was lucky, Not independent
Board 2250  250 11%  53% 133
At least two of: Highest volatility quartile,
Preceding grant was lucky, Not independent
Board 152 19 0.125 57% 11
At least two of: Highest volatility decile,
Preceding grant was lucky, Not independent
Board 71 13 18% 73% 956
Table 15: LUCK IN THE ECONOMY
The table shows statistics of lucky grants by industries. Industries are defined as the 12 Fama-French industries. The expected number of lucky grants is based on the
fraction of days where the price is at the lowest price of the month relative to the total number of trading days in the month. For CEOs with only one grant, it is the
product of the number of CEOs with only one grant and the probability of observing the lowest price in the month. This probability is equal to the number of days
where the price was the lowest price of the month divided by the total number of trading days in that month.  For CEOs with more than one grant, the expected number
of CEOs who receive at least one grant at the lowest price is equal to one minus the probability of having each grant not being lucky. The latter is one minus the product
of the probabilities that each individual grant is at the lowest price of the month. The same methodology is used to calculate the expected number of firms that give at
least one grant in a month. New economy firms are defined as in Murphy (2003) (New economy firms are part of the Business Equipment, Telecom and Shops
industries.). Old economy firms are firms that are not new-economy firms. The last column (row 1) contains the regression coefficient of the new-economy industry
where the regression corresponds to the first-column  regression in Table 11. The last column (rows 4-15) contains the regression coefficients on the industry dummies.
The benchmark industry is the Energy industry. The regression corresponds to the first-column regression in Table 11 where the new economy dummy is replaced by
the Fama-French industry dummies. ***, *, indicate significance at the 1% and 10% level.

















New economy 794  2581  14% 59%  12%  16% 0.197 ***
Old economy 5025  16455  12%  48% 9% 12%
12 Fama-French Industries
Business  Equipment:  Computers,  Software,  and  Electronic  Equipment  1300  4477  15%  59%  13%  17%  0.226
Telecom: Telephone and Television Transmission 199 524 13% 57% 9% 10% 0.123
Other: Mines, Constr, BldMt, Trans, Hotels, Bus Serv, Entertainment 786  2433  13% 55%  12%  16%  0.141
Chem: Chemicals and Allied Products 82 304  13%  53%  12%  14%  0.154
Health: Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drugs 657  2437  13% 53%  12%  14%  0.119
Energy:  Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction and Products 175  570  12%  50%  11%  14%
Shops:  Wholesale,  Retail,  and  Some  Services  (Laundries,  Repair  Shops)  593  1923  12%  50%  10%  13%  0.065
Consumer Durables: Cars, TV's, Furniture, Household Appliances 118 395 11% 46% 9% 12% 0.017
Manufacturing:  Machinery,  Trucks,  Planes,  Off  Furn,  Paper,  Com  Printing  491  1729  11%  41% 6% 9% -0.129
Utilities 100 298 9%  35% 4% 7% -0.383
Consumer  NonDurables:  Food,  Tobacco,  Textiles,  Apparel,  Leather,  Toys  229  780  10%  34% 5% 7% -0.176
Money: Finance 1089  3166 9%  32% 5% 6% -0.268*57
TABLE 16: THE PAYOFFS OF BEING LUCKY
The table reports averages of different variables capturing the value of the options granted relative to various benchmarks by price-rank. The Black-Scholes value of the
option grant is computed using information from Thomson about the grant date, maturity date, and strike price. The risk free rate is the three-month T-bill rate. The
volatility is estimated based on daily stock returns in the year prior to the grant month. Observations with fewer than 30 return observations were excluded. There are
three benchmark Black-Scholes values: First, the value of an option with the strike price of the grant but the stock price is the median price of the month. Second, an
expected option price, which is  the average over Black-Scholes option values in the grant month, where the daily option values are based on the strike price of the
actual grant date but the stock price is the price of the day in the month. Third, the value of the option on the last day of the month. This value is computed using the
strike price of the actual grant and the stock price at the last trading day of the month. All other Black-Scholes parameters are held constant for each of the benchmarks.
We report ratios of the benchmarks to the actual grant value in the first three rows and the number of observations below. The following three rows, labeled dollar
underreporting, show average dollar values of the difference between the benchmark and the actual grant value. The dollar values reported are expressed in 2005 dollars
using the CPI index. The following three rows present the ratio of the dollar underreporting (not inflation adjusted) relative to the total compensation of the CEO. Total
compensation is from ExecuComp (tdc1) and hence reduces the sample size. The dollar underreporting is calculated as the ratio of benchmark to grant value (presented
in the first three rows) minus one, times the Black-Scholes value of the options reported by ExecuComp.
Lucky  2nd 3
rd 3rd 2nd
  (lowest)  lowest   Lowest   highest  highest  Highest
Ratio of option value at median price relative to option value at grant price 1.1962 1.1195 1.0913 0.9366 0.9179 0.8917
Ratio of expected option value relative to option value at grant price 1.2001 1.1282 1.0939 0.9387 0.9189 0.892
Ratio of option value at last day of month relative to option value at grant price 1.2136 1.1435 1.1117 0.9543 0.9236 0.9011
Observations 2230 1591 1400 917 877 783
Dollar underreporting (estimate based on option value at median price)   $1,395,375  $547,457  $404,311  $(199,885)  $(222,513)  $(289,438)
Dollar underreporting (estimate based on expected option value)   $1,380,259  $546,191  $441,007  $(204,700)  $(212,609)  $(245,424)
Dollar underreporting (estimate based on option value at last price)   $1,719,200  $725,892  $718,949  $(155,826)  $(219,464)  $(265,564)
Observations 2230 1591 1400 917 877 783
Dollar underreporting/total compensation (median price estimate) 9.91% 5.78% 4.87% -3.00% -3.57% -4.89%
Dollar underreporting/total compensation (expected price estimate) 9.69% 6.22% 4.81% -2.90% -3.48% -4.87%
Dollar underreporting/total compensation (last price estimate) 9.07% 6.40% 4.94% -2.08% -3.09% -5.22%
Observations 656 505 453 333 305 32458
TABLE 17: TOTAL REPORTED COMPENSATION AND LUCKY GRANTS
The sample consists of option grants to CEOs who are listed in ExecuComp as the CEO for the year. The dependent variable is
the natural log of total compensation (tdc1) from ExecuComp. The independent variables are: A dummy for lucky equal to one if
the grant was on the lowest day of the month. The ratio of implied underreported option value to total compensation (relative
luck), where the implied underreporting is calculated as the ratio of the benchmark to grant value minus one, times the Black-
Scholes value of the options reported by ExecuComp. The benchmark value is computed as the value of an option with the strike
price of the grant, but the stock price is the median price of the month. All other parameters are held constant.  The standard
deviation of the daily stock returns in the year prior to the fiscal year where the grant was given. The log of the book value of
assets. The return on assets (ROA) computed as net income divided by book value of assets. Industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q where
the industry adjustment was made at the 2-digit SIC level. Leverage is the ratio of book value of debt divided by book value of
assets. Firm return t is the cumulative stock return in the year of the grant (t) and the year prior to the grant (t-1). New Economy
is a dummy equal to one for new economy industries as defined in Murphy (2003). CEO age and tenure are from ExecuComp.
We report coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets) of OLS regressions with year and industry dummies (at the 2-digit SIC level).
The year and industry dummies are not shown. Errors are clustered at the firm level and t-statistics are based on robust standard
errors. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Dependent Variable ln(Total Compensation)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lucky 0.078 0.075
(2.21)** (2.13)**
Relative gain from luck 0.242 0.238
(1.92)* (1.86)*
Standard deviation of 7.017 7.013 7.515 7.458
  daily stock returns (4.55)*** (4.42)*** (4.62)*** (4.43)***
Log book value 0.486 0.485 0.488 0.488
(39.61)*** (38.33)*** (38.61)*** (37.38)***
ROA 0.224 0.170 0.184 0.125
(1.34) (0.98) (1.08) (0.72)
Ind-adj Tobin's Q 0.099 0.099 0.107 0.107
(8.72)*** (8.61)*** (8.85)*** (8.75)***
Leverage -0.263 -0.273 -0.313 -0.325
(2.80)*** (2.88)*** (3.38)*** (3.51)***
Firm return t 0.041 0.042 0.025 0.022
(1.28) (1.29) (0.76) (0.67)
Firm return t-1 0.179 0.171 0.177 0.171
(6.38)*** (5.97)*** (6.21)*** (5.85)***
New Economy 0.223 0.227 0.230 0.234






CEO age<50 -0.009 0.012
(0.22) (0.30)
CEO age >65 -0.242 -0.183
(2.84)*** (2.11)**
CEO age missing -0.015 -0.007
(0.41) (0.19)
Constant 5.995 3.481 6.023 3.578
(39.74)*** (24.37)*** (38.41)*** (25.07)***
Observations 4547 4325 4276 4058
R-squared 0.54 0.55 0.54 0.5559
TABLE 18: ESTIMATING THE INCIDENCE OF MANIPULATED SUPER-LUCKY GRANTS
The table reports the actual and expected number of grants. The expected number of grants is computed as the number of days with a certain price rank in a quarter where a grant was given
divided by the number of trading days in that quarter where the stock actually traded. The reported number is the sum of this ratio by rank.  Exercise Price/Median Stock Price is the average
of the ratio of the exercise price of the option in a given rank to the median stock price in the quarter of the grant. The sample consists of 19017 option grants to insiders between 1996-2005,
and is taken from Thomson Financial’s insider-transaction database. The sample size is reduced because we require at least one trading day in each of the months of the quarter. Grants
Before SOX and Grants After Sox are grants whose strike date is before and on or after September 1
st, 2002 respectively. Quarters are defined by calendar time. Old economy firms are
defined as firms that are not New economy firms following the definition in Murphy 2003). Panel B shows the number of CEOs with one to five-and-more grants in the sample. The fourth
column shows the expected number of CEOs who receive at least one grant at the lowest price of the quarter. This number is computed in the following way: For CEOs with only one grant,
it the product of 4510 (CEOs with only one grant) and the probability of observing the lowest price in the quarter. This probability is equal to the number of days where the price was the
lowest price of the quarter divided by the total number of trading days in that quarter.  For CEOs with more than one grant, the expected number of CEOs who receive at least one grant at the
lowest price is equal to one minus the probability of having each grant not being lucky. The latter is one minus the product of the probabilities that each individual grant is at the lowest price
of the quarter. The same methodology is used to calculate the expected number of firms that give at least one grant in a quarter.
Panel A: Super-Lucky Grants Distribution
Before SOX After SOX Overall Overall, Old Economy
Total Number of Grants 11987 7030 19017 16037
Price rank of grant date in the price

























Actual Number of Grants 792 529  477 200 170 166 992 699 643  793 582 547
Actual/Total grants 6.6% 4.4%  4.0% 2.8% 2.4% 2.4% 5.2% 3.7%  3.4%  4.9% 3.6% 3.4%
Expected Number of Grants 253 256  254 126 126 125 379 382 378  322 324 321
Actual-Expected 539 273  223 74  44  41 613 317 265 471 258  226
(Actual-Expected)/Actual 68% 52%  47% 37% 26% 25% 62% 45%  41%  59% 44% 41%
Exercise  Price/Median  Stock  Price  0.77  0.83 0.85 0.84  0.85 0.88 0.79  0.83  0.86  0.81  0.84 0.87
Panel B: Distribution of Grants by CEO and Firm
#  Grants  CEOs










1 4510 280 102 178 175% 64% 4%
2 1874 179 74 105 142% 59% 6%
3 1050 157 59 98 167% 63% 9%
4 549 101 39 62 161% 62% 11%
>4 837 261 92 169 185% 65% 20%
All 8820 978 365 614 168% 63% 7%
Firms  Actual  #  Firms
1 1880 138 47 91 193% 66% 4.8%
2 1106 137 49 88 178% 64% 7.9%
3 860 135 50 85 169% 63% 9.9%
4 569 95 42 52 124% 55% 9.2%
>4 1404 474 170 305 180% 64% 21.7%
All 5819 979 359 620 173% 63% 10.7%60
TABLE 19: SUPER-LUCKY GRANTS WITH
HIGH LIKLIHOOD OF MANIPULATION
This table displays the number of grants at the lowest price of the quarter conditional on a number of
variables. Those variables are: 1) Highest volatility quartile (decile). Volatility is defined as the distance
between the lowest and the median price in a quarter. 2) Preceding grant was lucky. This dummy variable
is equal to one if the CEO’s previous grant was at the lowest price of the month. 3) Not independent Board.
This dummy is equal to one if the board is not majority independent. The variable is only available for a
subset of firms with IRRC data available. We show statistics on the pre-SOX sample only. We also
compute the expected number of grants given the number of days in a quarter where the price was the
lowest price of the month. The unexpected number of grants is the difference between the actual and













Highest volatility quartile 2911 423 15% 88% 372
Highest volatility decile 1160 171 15% 88% 151
Preceding grant lucky 765 189 25% 92% 174
No independent board 713 99 14% 87% 86
At least one of: Highest volatility
quartile, Preceding grant was lucky,
No independent board 3861 600 16% 88% 529